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"Let there be progress, therefore; a widespread and eager progress in every century and epoch, both of individuals and of the general body, of every Christian and of the whole Church, a progress in intelligence, knowledge and wisdom, but always within their natural limits, and without sacrifice of the identity of Catholic teaching, feeling and opinion."—ST. VINCENT OF LERINS, *Commonit*, c. 6.

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THE FURTHER DISAPPEARANCE OF REALITY IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

While the great gnostic movement, which Hegel had started coursing on its way, was passing through the stages of inner reform previously described,[1] opposition of a varied kind was not lacking from without. French thought did not take kindly to the doctrine, so warmly welcomed on the other side of the Rhine, that human reason would eventually penetrate the secrets of nature and turn the night of mystery into the splendor of noonday. There was nothing in the recent history of thought, either on the continent, or beyond the 'silver streak' of the English channel, to warrant this unlimited confidence. Failure, rather than success, seemed to be the direction in which philosophy was drifting; and men arose, as they always do in periods of over-confidence, who took their own misgivings and the signs of the times, and made a philosophy out of them, or at least attempted to make one. Nor was there dearth of material for the construction of just such a philosophy of protest. It was easy to remind the Cartesians that they could not at will repudiate their indebtedness to the ancients, and forswear all allegiance to the history of the past—a reminder, by the way, which the latter-day philosophers of the practical might also take to themselves with profit; and it was easier still to taunt the fol-

[1] *Catholic University Bulletin*, December, 1909. "The Disappearance of Reality in Modern Philosophy."

lowers of the Frenchman with their inability to repair the bridge, connecting the worlds of mind and matter, which had been blown up by destructive criticism.

Monism Versus Dualism.

The same French Socrates, when he reformed and refined the art of philosophizing, had raised hopes which those who came after had but dashed in turn. Men of a radical bent of mind, who looked to philosophy for social rather than individual betterment, naturally expected some golden grain from the promised harvest of reform, and were disappointed at the "broken chaff well meant for grain" that seemed to them to come instead. The sense of reality appeared to be on the wane. Prejudice was increasing against any philosophy that professed the duality of soul and body, subject and object. This latter pair of opposites, which anyone who took the pains might find dwelling amicably together in his concrete experience, had been pried apart by the artifice of method until they became in the abstract the most deadly of enemies conceivable. Dualism seemed to have had its day and ceased to be. Monism in some form or other—and there was no occasion for bemoaning lack of variety in the specimens, either before Descartes or after—replaced it. Henceforth the lamb was to lie down with the lion, not indeed beside him, but "benevolently assimilated" in a way not contemplated by the prophet Isaiah, or the poet Virgil.

There was Berkeley with his theory of substantial mind and unsubstantial matter; and there was Leibnitz with his conception of Nature as a prose-poem of myriad monads, individual all, yet so foreordained to harmony as to register and reflect sympathetically the changes occurring in all other monads, which thus conspired to "make one music as before but vaster"; there was Spinoza with his universe of almost mathematical precision, in which one single divine substance appeared under the two limiting phases of 'thought' and 'extension'; La Mettrie and his world of "joyous matter"; Condillac and his world of "pleasurable sense"; Helvetius and his world of

"virtuous self-interest." On the other hand, Hume proposed a world of pure phenomena in which substantial reality had left not even a wrack behind; Kant stood for the moral reconstruction of reality out of Hume's debris; Fichte would build the world up again on the only sure foundation of reality, namely, "personal self-activity," from which all blessings were supposed to flow; Schelling would sink the tormenting difference of subject and object in an absolute reality which is by nature "blank of all distinction," and consequently so indeterminate as to identify all contradictions in the bosom of a pacific sea of being; Hegel preferred an atlantic ocean of unrest for his starting point, and so proposed to substitute for Schelling's static absolute an "absolute of activity," in which all differences are immanently contained, and in which subject and object become one and the same reality in a course of progressive self-disclosure; Schopenhauer saw nothing but a chaos in which irrational will was the sole reality; and Voltaire built up a philosophy of fine scorn and scoffing pessimism on the fact that one half of the world neither knew nor cared how the other half lived. Paris danced while Lisbon crumbled in an earthquake. "*Lisbonne est abimée et l'on danse à Paris.*"

The Real is the Believed.

Thought began to sicken at the sight of all this surfeiting metaphysics. Something appeared to be wrong with the instrument of logic which turned out such an array of mutually subversive views. From this babel of tongues, De Bonald fled for refuge to the theory that language contains, fossilized in words, the primitive revelation made by God to man; Bonetty found no sure resting place save in the Scriptures and the Church; de Lammenais appealed from the utter incompetence of the individual reason to the common consent of mankind, hoping to find in the social reason an effective means of deliverance from the vagaries of isolated minds. Tertullian had indeed come back to taunt gnosticism with its second failure and to repeat his counsel of immediate flight from all its learned

pretense. In our own day, do we not hear the pragmatist proclaiming the bankruptcy of science and metaphysics as a prelude to his gospel of salvation by "works" alone? Unfortunately these champions of fideism and traditionalism condemned the use of reason along with its abuse. Not all "was rotten in the state of Denmark," and a remedy should never have been proposed which was, if anything, worse than the disease. Intellectualism could not be declared moribund because a handful of metaphysicians had treated the world to an overdose. There was still a chance that intellectualism would shrink back again to its natural size and recover from over-inflation. There is a minimum as well as a maximum in systems, and a doctrine is never refuted until it is refuted at its best.

The Real is the Unknowable.

The great gnostic movement of idealism, with its fair promise of clearing up the mystery of the world according as the depths of human self-consciousness were increasingly explored, brought about also by a natural reaction the counter doctrine of "intrinsically unknowable reality." It is not surprising to find the idealist's attempt to put a gnostic construction on the principle of evolution or development paralleled by the opposite efforts of the sceptic to interpret the principle in favor of agnosticism—a term invented by Huxley in the late fifties to suggest the contrast between his own unpretentious ignorance and the extensive knowledge of things human and divine which the gnostics of the second and third centuries claimed to possess. The rival doctrine of the "unknowable" thus entered into competition with empirical and rational idealism. The agnosticism of Herbert Spencer admits the existence of absolute reality but denies the possibility of knowing it. Reality is in itself inscrutable; our so-called knowledge of it being nothing more than a convenient set of mental symbols by means of which we represent reality to ourselves after having previously, in the very process of knowing, transfigured, or should we not say, disfigured, it. In our ultimate scientific, philosophic, or religious

ideas, we have no real knowledge of the actual, but merely a number of signs or symbols substituted for the actual itself. Spencer thus extended to belief the adverse criticism which Hamilton, Mansel, and the fideists just mentioned, had limited to knowledge.

We may pause long enough here to remark that the attempt to construct a consistent philosophy of the "unknowable" has proved a signal failure; it has not been able to hold its ground against attack, and owes what apparent success it may have had to the false principle that we know only what we can define, represent, or explain. This attempt to make knowledge synonymous with definition and scientific explanation, or to mark the boundaries of thought by those of the imagination, is sufficient to condemn the whole agnostic movement. If there be pretense in the gnostic's claim that the mind of man will eventually know everything, there is impudence added to pretense in the claim of the agnostic that the mind of man will never know anything of reality at all. The wonderful progress of science has favored the idealist in his duel with the agnostic. Both are extremists, it is true, from the standpoint of the moderate realist. The endeavor to frame a complete rational synthesis of the knowable is as manifestly impossible as the attempt to construct a philosophy of the unknowable which will stand the test of theoretical and practical consistency. But still it is more natural to believe with the idealist that the world will become relatively more and more known, even though never completely so, than to hold with the agnostic of a familiar type that all human efforts to know reality must finally empty into the dark chamber of nescience, which Spencer obligingly provides as the common meeting-room where science, philosophy and religion gather, not to report progress, but to confess the complete failure of their combined efforts to penetrate the eternal night. The children of 'darkness' were apparently not wiser in this instance than the children of 'light.'

Humanism Versus Naturalism.

Enough has been said thus far in the course of this historical review to enable the reader to see the almost exclusive direction in which philosophical thought is travelling. The constantly growing tendency is to regard man as a student of himself, not of Nature; and in all this one may see the index finger of René Descartes who was the first in modern times to think, if not to say, that "the proper study of mankind is man." It would be wrong, however, to suppose that this intense humanism of philosophical thought was allowed to make headway unchallenged and unimpeded. Joseph has had his dreams of the seven fat and seven lean kine over again, and also of the reeds that bowed down in worship before him, nor has he been slow to interpret his dreams to the elder brethren. The modern man of science has always been fonder of knowing Nature than of studying himself. He would rather look outward any day than inward, and is hard of hearing when philosophers are around. According to his view, the scientific theory, he calls it, the universe is an enclosed mechanical system, which brooks no interference with the uniform sequence of events, and has no room for such disturbances as human emotions in its reign of law. Quite naturally he leaves himself out of the scenes he reproduces, just as the photographer does, and with the same unconcern. But he believes that man is first, last, and always a student of the world of things, and this is the reason for mentioning him here so prominently. He represents the spectator's, as opposed to the producer's, attitude towards nature and reality.

The man of science and his brother the philosopher thus divide an indivisible world between them, and wrangle concerning the merits of the respective halves. As a result we have the humanistic view, on the one hand, which makes man the supreme and central instance of Nature, and the naturalistic view, on the other, which considers him a late arrival, and at best but a recent incident in the cosmic process of events. It was from this latter standpoint that Professor Fiske wrote his "Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy," and Huxley delivered his "Oxford Ad-

dress," in which he held out but small hope of man's ever issuing victorious from his conflict with a world supremely indifferent to his interests. These two rival doctrines of man—an excessive humanism and an equally excessive naturalism—thus enter into competition. The aim of science is to de-personalize man, to dethrone him from his kingship over creation, and to exhibit him in consequence as an effect or product of natural forces in the regular course of events; that of philosophy, on the contrary, is to personalize Nature itself into a self-conscious Whole.

Each view thus carries the war into the other's territory, until even the methods of education register and reflect these two conflicting estimates of man's place in the universe. Classical studies retain or lose their central importance according as the object of education is considered to be the development of all man's powers, or merely the training of a number of scientific observers. We have but to recall in this connection the " gentleman of the old school " to whom culture was a second nature, and knowledge, like virtue, its own reward, to realize the vast difference between the widely educated man of the past generation and the specially trained man of the present, who acquires knowledge, not for its own sake, but to convert it into practical use and profit. Verily, wisdom is justified of her children.

In the actual conflict of these two opposite conceptions of man, modern idealism, much as we may disagree with its fundamental point of view, has helped to accomplish one great good which stands to its credit in these intensely practical and commercial times. It has successfully resisted the attempt of science to banish the idea of purpose, and has shown that mechanical and physical explanations cannot take the place of the doctrine of final causes. In thus withstanding the efforts of science to secure a monopoly over the philosophy of the spiritual itself, idealism has shown convincingly that we cannot think the universe through in the terms and formulas of modern physics. It is all very well for science to look backward to the original antecedents out of which the world has gradually or instantly sprung, and to forget all about foresight in its unweaning love

of hindsight. But philosophy looks forward to the end which is being realized as well as backward to the beginning of events. It has been said that man thinks backwards, but lives forwards. This saying may be more smart than true, yet it serves to show that thought has a future, no less than a past reference, and that there are consequents for philosophy as there are antecedents for science. The mind cannot be made to face exclusively either the past or the future for its explanations. It is a revolving light, not a fixed beacon.

Accordingly the idealist constantly reminds his scientific brother of the utter inadequacy of physical formulas to explain the world. As fast as the physicist, the biologist, and the sociologist, in their respective fields, advance explanations based upon the preconception that the universe is a huge interacting machine, the idealist promptly proceeds to show that the world, so far from being a machine, is a purposive agency. Purpose, he points out, is not a substitute for mechanism, but a deeper explanation of reality. Physical conceptions are all provisional, hypothetical, incomplete, unsatisfactory. It is not necessary to be sympathetic with the position of the idealist here; one may view the battle from afar as an interested spectator merely, and yet appreciate the fact that the philosopher deals far harder blows than he receives. The ambition of the man of science to dictate his method to the philosopher and to make machinery rather than purpose the order of the day in human thought has thus been frustrated. The philosophy of mind has not had its arm shortened even in these latter days when matter has found its cleverest defenders and boldest spokesmen.

This dignified defence of rational and spiritual, as opposed to physical and mechanical theories of explanation, characterizes the attitude of the speculative idealists of our day. Idealists of the pragmatic kind are not content to point out the inability of physical conceptions to account for the ordered world in which we live; they go further, and adopt a contemptuous attitude toward the foundations and conclusions of modern science itself. Do we human beings with all our feelings, needs, and ideal strivings, count for nothing in the universe, or " make

no difference" to it? Must we frame a cold, dispassionate theory of the world as a set of mechanical contrivances indifferent to human aspirations, as science bids us, or enlarge the theory so as to make room for the inclusion of the warmth of human feeling? The physicist forgets that the world exists, or may be made to exist, for human advantage, use, and satisfaction. Content with this pointed query, the pragmatist pronounces science bankrupt, because of the thin, impoverished, non-human theory it proposes of reality. And lest science should be encouraged to renew the combat, the pragmatist straightway declares everything below protoplasm unreal. Space and time, atoms and molecules are not more ultimately real than the reality of our perceptions each moment. It is considered a mistake to regard conceptions of any kind as bringing us closer to ultimate reality than our perceptions succeed in doing.[2] The world is human, or it is nothing, says the humanist, nor does the pragmatist always fail to join him in the statement.

The Real is the Conscious.

Philosophy thus ignores the protest of science, refuses the invitation to shift its central point of view from man to things, and goes on steadily with its work of constructing the universe from within on the strictly human basis of thought, will, or feeling. This is a point of view hard for the natural realist to sympathize with, but it is necessary to a philosophy which makes the initial mistake of considering the real as wholly, or for the most part, an intra-mental affair. The aim is somehow or other to get inside reality, to study it, so to speak, in the laboratory of the human consciousness itself. Here if anywhere, it is said, reality may be studied in the making; not that ready-made, finished product which presents itself as an external world when we assume toward it the passive attitude of the scientific observer, but that intimate inner reality, with which we come into direct

[2] *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. IV, No. 4, February 14, 1907. "A Reply to Mr. Pitkin:" William James. Pp. 105–106.

contact in the actual workings of our own consciousness. In other words, the point of immediacy is the subject, and not the object at all.

The Real is the Unconscious.

This "inside" as contrasted with the "outside" point of view has also tended to make a philosophy of the unconscious more significant to some thinkers than a philosophy of the conscious. There have not been wanting those, since Hartmann's time, who confidently expect, by penetrating into the depths of the unconscious region of the mind, by uncovering layer after layer of "buried" experience, to strike at last upon the rock-bottom of original reality itself. This spiritual geology, with its theory of the stratified soul, its set task of removing the successive crusts of hardened racial habit, and its patient study of man's fossilized mental remains, shows the extent to which these excavators of the mind hope to carry their explorations. They would unearth out of the past experience of the race the earliest form under which man viewed the world, the soul, and God. This earliest conception they would regard as surviving ever since throughout all the changes it has undergone. One readily recalls in this connection the attempt of Comte, Spencer, and the positivists generally, to trace the origin of the belief in a personal God to the crude, unscientific notions which early man formed of the powers at work in the stormy upheavals of Nature. These unseemly notions constantly reappear, it is said, in the consciousness of man, and as constantly vitiate his belief in a personal supreme Being.

A little reflection on the fact that experience is not an entity to be detached from the experiencing subjects would soon show that the occurrence of similar experiences in many individuals is quite another thing from the recurrence of one and the same experience in all; it would also show that the worship of ghosts and ancestors is no inherited early type of thought at all, but merely the like reaction of like minds under like circumstances. It is to be hoped that we are through with this attempted re-

duction of the reality of religion to such stuff as dreams were made of in those olden days, when men first saw their little lives rounded by a sleep, and the limit set to time drove their thoughts out towards eternity. There is no longer any terror experienced from the wands of these modern conjurers, who used to make the primitive savage, submerged within us, rise to the surface of consciousness again, to shame us out of countenance at the sight of our supposed former self, and to make us feel, no doubt, that distance does not always lend enchantment to the view. We know now how unfair it was to the facts of history to make the poor savage sit for a composite photograph of early humanity, as if the freshness of youth and the accumulation of decay were one and the same. We have recovered from the sophism which decides the validity of an idea merely by rehearsing its pedigree; which offers as proof that thought-forms are inherited the innocent fact of their resemblance. The theory of the independent, spontaneous origin of similars is far more to the point than the theory that a single, simple thought-form was transmitted by heredity.

The Three Constructions put upon "Experience."

It is well to pause at this stage of our journey through history to take a last look at scenes that are disappearing from view and to refresh ourselves for those that are to come, for "the old order changeth, yielding place to new." The efforts of idealists have surely been varied enough all along to suit the most fastidious choice. But this lack of unity is in the details, not in the animating purpose, which is clear and constant. This purpose is to make the content of human experience the content of the real itself. Not reality, but the actual or possible experiencing of it, constitutes the idealist's world. It is as a 'brain-event,' as a resultant in consciousness rather than as a determinant outside it, that the physical universe has come to be familiarly regarded by philosophers of this type. The problem of the existence of God, or that of an external world, thus

becomes a minor phase of another problem, What is the nature of "experience"? Can reason build any superstructure on it at all? Does it point beyond itself to the infinite and the absolute? or only just enough beyond itself to make progress always possible as a sort of luring, beneficent mirage? Or is experience, when all is said, a sure indication of God's existence, but no clue whatever to His nature and character?

All these views of the case have been entertained, all three of them still find supporters, the rational idealist championing the first, the pragmatist the second, and the rather lone Spencerian the third. It is a question with all of these advocates simply and solely of what interpretation experience will bear. Realism in its traditional sense scarcely receives any more consideration than that which is implied in a passing rebuff. During the course of the history which we have just traced, two leading constructions have been put upon experience, the positive or the gnostic, and the negative or the agnostic; the former claiming that we have an everyday, direct, familiar acquaintance with the "absolute mind" of the universe; the latter flatly denying that we can know anything but the shadows which reality throws upon our mental screen. It seems to have been reserved in the philosophic fates for the pragmatist to appear at just this juncture with a new and third interpretation, from which he expects the complete and lasting discomfiture of all professional doubters. The cure of doubt which he proposes is simple. Cease regarding reality as something other than yourself, and then all your doubts will vanish. Reality is the human act of experiencing, not anything experienced at all. Experience is reality.

Pragmatism[3] and Agnosticism.

The pragmatist proceeds at once to apply his new method of "psychic treatment." The first patient treated is the agnostic, who is continually asserting that reality exists, though it baffles

[3] Pragmatism is here considered as a theory of reality solely. Its other aspects lie outside the scope of the present article.

all our human attempts to become acquainted with it. The pragmatist shows that no such embarrassment exists from his point of view. There is no necessity, he says, for supposing a physical world of objects existing independently of consciousness and defying all our efforts to penetrate the secret of its foreign constitution. The "traditional" realism may have raised such a problem, but the "new realism" sets it aside, we are told, outflanks it, as it were, in passing. According to the new realism, objects are independent of us in the sole sense that they are "free to enter or leave our conscious experience." Knowing is therefore a kind of being or reality, and one with which we may all become directly acquainted, whatever we may be tempted to think or say of all other kinds. The agnostic is therefore given to understand by the immediate empiricist that reality is not so hopelessly outside and beyond him as he is inclined to think. He is counselled to drop all his "other-worldness," and assured that, on his doing so, all his perplexities will cease. The trouble all comes, he is told, from not recognizing the 'reality' of his own experience, from not admitting that the substance of the universe and the substance of his own mental states are identical. Reality is on the march, not at rest.[4] Our experience is likewise moving; it is a stream that rises nowhere, for all we know, and flows nowhere, so far as we can discover, but then we are at least certain that the stream itself is real, even though there be nothing above, beyond, or beneath it, to which we may attain with perfect surety. Why then trouble ourselves about unexperienced worlds, and especially about that universe of external reality which is supposed to exist independently in the order of space and time? We have a very reliable sort of domestic information when we do not venture abroad in search of such "foreign news." He who dwells within a world of "pure experience" is assured of philosophic salvation.

Alas! this modern adaptation of Berkeley has already had the verdict of history registered against it. Berkeley thought

[4] "The essence of life is its continuously changing character." "A Pluralistic Universe." William James. p. 253.

he had effectually disposed of the atheists when he razed the world of matter to its foundations, and thus to all intents and purposes, apparently, made "homeless" waifs of all such scoffers. But agnosticism was even then in the loins of David Hume of Edinburg, and Kant was paying tithes by anticipation to the Scotchman who succeeded only too well in quickening the drowsy wits of idealist philosophers. We are not ridding ourselves of the doubter when we change the meaning of the word "real" from its natural sense of *something* experienced to that of the *act* of experiencing; or when we draw atttenion from the physical to the psychical world, and say that knowing is one kind of reality, with which at least we may claim direct acquaintance. The agnostic does not mind the destruction of the "outbuildings" of philosophy. He follows us into the supposedly safe department of the mind's interior; for, what have we done but re-christen him with the name of pragmatist, panpsychist, or immediate empiricist, and what have we given him but a "new realism" to sharpen his wits upon? It is all very well to admit, as most pragmatists do, that knowing is not creating, and that idea and object are not single, but dual. This admission may save them from subjectivism, but it leaves the so-called "new" realists still far away from a genuine admission of reality as something distinct from anybody's and everybody's ideas of it. The world cannot be fairly represented as merely a matter of experiencing, and not anything experienced at all.

Pragmatism and Idealism.

The second patient to receive treatment from the pragmatist is the rational idealist—that impractical elder brother whom the youngest member of the idealist family is now instructing unto philosophic salvation by showing him that "works" count more than "ideas." The pragmatist renounces the methods of rational idealism, its "absolutes," and "inner selves," its "transcending egos," and "fleshless abstractions." He will have none of the doctrine that "nothing is, but thinking makes it so."

Will and feeling, and the actual experiencing of needs, are for him surer and better means of knoweldge than the pale white light of reason. The winding way to the "absolute" which the rational idealist maps out is too long and slippery for practically-minded men to follow. To go from concrete experience into our inner consciousness, and there make the acquaintance of the "self"; and then to go back a stage further until we discover the supreme Self, in which ours is to be explained, seems like being asked to follow a course which is one point off reality at the start and two points off at the close. It is just as hard to get back to actuality again after such a trip to the mind's hinterlands as it was to make the original journey itself.

For the pragmatist, "philosophic discourse should be limited to what is experienced or experienceable." There is nothing to be taken as more ultimately real than the reality of the perceptive moment. Reality and experience are a single, flowing stream. Reason should not be permitted to turn this stream into a stagnant pool of water, which the pragmatist accuses it of doing, perhaps because he imagines that "reason" is the same as "reasoning." We are evidently in the Heraclitic flux once more, though we should hardly expect to see Heraclitus and Parmenides at odds again in the nineteenth century on the question whether the world is a pluralism or a unity. Zeno, the father of dialectics, who generously chose the part of a go-between in favor of Parmenides and unity, is meeting the fate of most intermediaries, that of drawing the fire of both combatants upon himself. But then history repeats itself and philosophy is history.

Kant fares no better than Hegel or his school at the hands of the new practicalists. The pragmatist finds it just as difficult to pick his way through the forest of Kant's abstractions as he does to tunnel under experience with the idealist. Was it not Huxley who said that Kant's baggage train was bigger than his army? Professor James is of the opinion that Kant's philosophy deserves a prominent place on the shelves of some museum where intricate and complicated specimens of the work-

ings of the human mind are preserved for the future inspection of the curious; it is ingenious artifice we inherit from the sage of Königsberg, and not a real philosophy of experience. In fact, Kant's system is a by-path. The true development of philosophy does not lie finally in the rational direction at all, the pragmatist contends.

It is for this reason that Professor James planned and executed his famous 'flanking movement' around the entire main line of German rationalism and back to the position in the rear originally occupied by Berkeley. The object of this manoeuver is to dislodge idealism of the rational sort from its fancied security, and to compel it to abandon the position which it has so long defended. Psychologically speaking, the inspiring motive of this new move is a supreme distrust of abstract reason. The ability of the mind to guide us through the mazes of our own experience to the recognition of the human and the divine self at different depths or levels within it, is flatly called in question. The theory that reality consists primarily in being conceived is definitely set aside, and Berkeley's theory of reality as a matter of pure perception is promoted to the first place in philosophic attention.

It is unfortunate that intellectualism of the prudent and tempered sort should ever have become involved in the attack on gnostic idealism with which it has no parentage or concern; and more so still, that it should go down to unmerited condemnation with the perhaps richly deserved punishment of the latter. We hope later, in a special study, to rescue it alive from the ruins. The protest of the pragmatist, if history furnishes any clue, and it usually affords the best means for computing the force of philosophical reactions, is against "the doctrine of an independent self-enclosed and self-sufficient world of pure thought," or in other words, against such empires of pure intellect as the Germans were fond of building, and not against intellect or reason as such. The Catholic philosopher is not interested either in "pure thought" or "pure experience." He has never cut the continuity between intellect and sense. He simply wishes therefore to be heard on his own be-

half as not guilty of the sins of others thus wrongly visited upon him. Immanentists, modernists, and pragmatists, we shall show later, are all misreporters of the attitude of the schoolmen.

Experience is Reality.

The present pass to which philosophy has come is therefore the doctrine that knowledge *makes* the world, and that experience *is* reality. To escape the withering charge that knowing is thus falsely identified with creating, and the *constructed* world of knowledge grossly confounded with the *apprehended* world of things, the pragmatist allows a distinction between reality as the *raw material,* and subjective experience as the *instrument,* of construction. None the less, however, for this distinction, he regards reality as "constructed" during the human process of knowing it, and the physical world is for him a formless sort of stuff, until the mind of man begins to put order, shape, and arrangement into its original chaos. But this distinction, made merely to conceal a desperate situation, and to throw critics off the right scent, accomplishes neither purpose; it is methodical rather than real. The pragmatist allows it merely, so it would seem, for the sake of getting his method well under way, as those who navigate the air first make use of the solid earth beneath their feet before rising into a thinner medium and sailing that other sea which hangs inverted over their heads. The pragmatic method, says, Professor Schiller, demands "an initial basis of fact as the condition of its getting to work at all." [5] This is all very well until we pry into the nature of this concession, and look this gift-horse of pragmatism in the mouth. Then we find that appearances are somewhat deceiving.

Pragmatists, to be consistent, are compelled to reduce even this assumed bit of initial reality to a psychic element; they cannot, on their own principles, assume a non-human or physical world. Professor Schiller himself affirms that "the notion of

[5] "Studies in Humanism," p. 426.

a plastic, growing, incomplete reality will permit us to conceive 'a making of reality' as really cosmic." He has gone so far as to say that the so-called material world, on which the mind acts, is akin to Aristotle's indeterminate prime matter. He thus converts [6] his theory of knowledge into a theory of reality without so much as turning a hair, and at the same time he indicates what little real value the much vaunted distinction between experience and reality has for a thorough-paced humanist like himself. Professor Dewey, on the supposition that reality is continuously evolving and experience likewise, will allow no transcendent or extra-mental reference to human knowledge. The French pragmatists, notably Le Roy, have drawn out all the conclusions lurking in their principles, and embraced empirical monism.

Professor James, on the other hand, the foster father of pragmatism, lags behind his children. He is trying hard to keep his favorite pragmatism from reaching its full logical stature in the more amplified form of it known as 'humanism'; with what success remains to be seen. He admits that "we receive the block of marble, but carve it to suit ourselves." [7] He says that "nothing could be sillier than to ignore the prior epistemological edifice in which the window is built, or to talk as if pragmatism began and ended at the window." Evidently then there is a reality which streams in through the window, and we are not absolute lords of the manor, makers and monarchs of all we survey. And yet, when Professor James seems to admit so frankly the reference of our thoughts to things outside our own actual experience, he is evidently not letting his left hand know what his right hand does, for he soon withdraws the proffered concessions. According to him the references of knowledge are all from one point in the stream of experience to another higher up or further on, but not necessarily beyond. There is no genuine transcendence of knowledge admitted at all; knowledge never leaps or bounds; it is 'ambulatory,' not 'saltatory,' to use his own expression. "Our

[6] Ibid., p. 434.
[7] "Pragmatism," p. 244.

ideas, when they add themselves to reality, partly predetermine the existent, and reality as a whole cannot be defined without taking into account our ideas also."

Professor James seeks refuge from the radical conclusions of pragmatism in the fact that the real material of human experience has at present an objective aspect and character,[8] whatever it may have been in the past or at the beginning. He is unwilling to go the full length of the logical journey with his fellow pragmatists who regard all the items of human knowledge as plastic and malleable, and are harking back to the prehistoric days with Schiller in the hope of uncovering the first layer of human experience in which so-called reality lies deposited and embedded. He wishes to steer clear of metaphysics, because pragmatism in its present stage, at any rate, is not tied to any metaphysical system, though it has decided preference for realism, if by the latter term we understand merely the opposite of subjectivism and absolute idealism.

No more than his fellow pragmatists will Professor James admit an absolute view of either the form or the content of human experience. He proposes, on the contrary, a relational theory of reality and consciousness. To his way of thinking, objects are intrinsically neutral or indifferent, and are made determinately this or that by the relations which they assume to themselves or to one another. Their proper nature is thus determined by the individual or mutual relations which they undergo, not by the fact of their becoming known. In thus abandoning the doctrine of subjectivism, that knowing is creating, Professor James advances a step in the direction of realism. But even he, too, has his substitute ready to install in the place of a physical world really located in the order of space and time. The rational idealist, it will be recalled, substituted 'absolute mind' for the physical universe; the agnostic would put an "unknowable blank" in its stead; Bradley would have it that there was, after all, such a reality as "psychic existence" to be taken into account; Professor James merely

[8] "Pragmatism," p. 244.

posits relations, and refuses to see in the world of things any intrinsic or absolute constitution of its own at all.

The idealist notion that the substance of the world is the divine mind itself, and God's own act of knowing, is abhorrent to Professor James, as indeed to all realist, not to say Christian, philosophers. But there is another notion of "substance," for which the pragmatists have a special predilection, though they insist that it forms no part of their philosophic outlook on the world and its ways, but is merely a matter of personal inclination. This is the "soft" notion of substance, as contrasted with the "hard" conception of it championed by the idealist, and usually goes by the name of "panpsychism," to which Professor James has prefixed the adjective "pluralistic," to indicate that the universe is for him an irrational affair that displays an infinite variety of details, but no unity of plan or fixity of constitution.[9] The panpsychism thus admitted may be described as the doctrine that the world is made of the same stuff as consciousness, and that things and persons, to all appearances isolated, are yet kept in secret communion, if not also in communication, as in the case of spirit-messages and other kindred phenomena, by means of the diffused psychic 'substance,' which serves as the common ground of their being, or, should we not rather say, relationship?

All this goes to show what significance is to be attached to the pragmatist's insistent demand to be called a 'realist.' When asked to take a definite stand on the question of the existence of a reality not ourselves, Professor James grows eloquent in affirming something more than windows to the house of knowledge, but, when pressed for further information, he retreats through the back door of consciousness into panpsychism and pluralism, and tells us of the number of supernatural beings which seek this mode of entrance in preference to the one in front, usually more conveniently located. History explains this unwillingness of Professor James to have anything to say about 'reality' beyond eloquent references to its irrational character. "Der Rhein ist Deutschlands

[9] "Pragmatism," p. 244.

Strom, nicht seine Grenze." Professor James is anxious to keep the German idealists and their heirs from trespassing upon his preserves of "pure experience," from securing a foothold there. Evidently the fear of the Germans and their "air ships" is not confined to Englishmen. In some respects the critic was not altogether wide of the mark who said of pragmatism that it is not so much a philosophy as a clever attempt to avoid one.

The first decade of the twentieth century thus finds three groups of philosophers eloquently at odds: the realists proper, who maintain that knowledge reveals an object independently existing; the transcendental idealists, who claim that objects exist only when we know them, and consequently have no existence independently of the fact of their being known; and the immediate empiricists, better known as pragmatists, who hold that knowledge has no reference whatever beyond experience, either to an external world, to consciousness, to the absolute being of God, to the subject experiencing, or to the object experienced, but is altogether concerned with the beneficial reactions which it arouses and the practical consequences to which it prompts and leads. The realists, therefore, champion the object, the idealists the content, and the pragmatists the act, of knowledge respectively.

Between a real world of substantial objects, an ideal world of eternal meaning and value, or a purely human world of fugitive, but enlightened self-interest, we are asked to choose. The pragmatist would debar from consideration the first two panoramas. The realistic world-view seems to him "a mutilated book of nature," and the idealistic an expensive "édition de luxe." He wants something cheaper both in binding and contents, it would seem, a book without preface or appendix, and a text that only he who runs may read. For the man of practical mind now turned philosopher, experience is reality, and knowing the most reliable kind of being. We have no longer to go outside ourselves, it is said, to seek the real and the true, the beautiful and the good. The one thing a cognitive act can surely know is another cognitive act, and in this

we have the essence of the new "realism." The physical world, long looked upon as the effect of creative power, is thus made to appear either as a creature of the mind's own making, constructed unawares in the twilight of early humanity before the present lights of criticism had begun to flare; or as a universal environment, in which objects appear as clusters of relations rather than as substantially constituted things. Nothing "is," everything is "becoming."

The reader of this historical sketch, which attempts to trace the pedigree of pragmatism, and its theory that reality is finished, if not altogether made, in the laboratory of human experience, will no doubt have observed, as the history draws to a close, that philosophers are coming suddenly around again to the front of the house of knowledge, after having been compelled for so long a time by the rational idealists to dwell and think in the back rooms. The line that parts the physical from the mental, so long blurred, is beginning to be recognized, though the recognition still leaves it almost imperceptibly thin. Aristotle's "prime matter," crossed and recrossed by a network of relations, and made as plastic as the ether itself, is all that is left of the universe. Reality, in the sense of "raw material" furnished to us in sensation, is admitted. As a "finished product" in an orderly world, it is still ignored. What really exists, we are told, is not things made, but things in the making, since the essence of life is continuous change.

Progress and development are indeed striking features of reality, but they are not the whole thing. It is a mistake to simplify reality so unduly, to exclude permanence and stability altogether from its constitution, and to attempt the writing of a philosophy of the world under the sole head of the changeful. The ideas of progress and permanence are not so exclusive as all that, and universal plasticity is not a necessary condition for making a progressive world possible. The impoverished conception of reality now in vogue is largely due to the custom, still retained by those who have overcome the inherited prejudices of idealism in other directions, of distilling reality out

of thought, out of preaccepted methods. The world as a chaos is thus admitted, while as a cosmos of orderly arrangement it is denied. The former is found to be at variance with no preconception adopted by the pragmatist, whereas the latter, if admitted, would spoil his theory completely. Perhaps it is to be regarded as even more wonderful that this bare admission of reality should ever have come in this round-about way. At any rate, the wise old schoolmen have had a few cubits added to their stature for not attempting to discover reality through the sole process of self-contemplation. *Naturam expellas furca, tamen usque recurret.*

EDMUND T. SHANAHAN.

MEMOIR OF FATHER TABB.

On November 19, 1909, there died at St. Charles' College, Ellicott City, Maryland, the poet and educator, Father Tabb. Poet he was without question, and as truly was he an educator. It was not so much that Father Tabb spent hours each day teaching in the class room as that he lived among his pupils, reaching them at all times, continuously exerting an influence that made for genuine culture and character. Nobody saw so much of Father Tabb as did his boys, to none did he reveal himself so fully. For twenty-five years he lived and taught at St. Charles' College. During that time some thousands of boys came under his influence, thousands of priests to-day cherish his memory as their teacher and friend. From this point of view, then, Father Tabb is to be regarded as an educator in the truest sense.

Born at "The Forest," in Amelia County, Virginia, on March 22, 1845, John Banister Tabb was the son of Episcopalian parents. The family was well known and connected by blood with some of the finest Virginia folk. In company with a sister and two brothers, John received his early education from private tutors. At the time when he was about to choose a profession the Civil War broke out, and young Tabb enlisted in the Confederate navy. He was selected captain's clerk of the *Robert E. Lee,* one of the most famous and successful blockade runners, commanded by the shrewd and dauntless Lieutenant Wilkinson. In 1864, in the midst of a term of excellent service, Tabb was taken prisoner, and remained in custody till the close of the war in 1865. It was during the time of his imprisonment that he first met Sidney Lanier and formed with that kindred spirit the friendship which both men so cherished.

At the end of the war Tabb turned his energies towards various ways of making a living, for the war had left him poor. He studied music and drawing and for a time taught

English in a western college. Not until 1872 did he essay any serious verse. In that year his first poem, "The Cloud," appeared in *Harper's Magazine*. In September of the same year, through the influence of Newman, he entered the Catholic Church and two months later was enrolled as a student in St. Charles' College. He was ordained priest in 1884, and from that year until the time of his death he held the position of instructor in English in his Alma Mater. About a year before he died his eyes, never strong, completely failed him; he became totally blind. But he tarried at St. Charles, among his boys, till the end came a few weeks ago.

Father Tabb was a curious personality, greatly loved by those who knew him, known only to few outside the company of his daily life. For not by the world was Father Tabb cherished as the kindly and quaint priest of St. Charles. If his boys have that memory of him they have it unshared. Father Tabb fled the world, 'man's congregation shunned.' Little of his personality was known without except, perhaps, the singularities by which it met inquiring curiosity. Indeed, Father Tabb's determination to elude the public betrayed him into paradoxes of behavior. One would never have known how reticent he was, for example, had he not written to the New York *Times* repudiating any connection with the biographical notice of himself appearing in "Who's Who." Father Tabb fled the world, but he gave now and then a backward glance over the shoulder to see whether he were pursued. At those times his eye seemed to gather whatever reference was made to himself in the American or English press. And periodically, too, would come the pat denial or correction in pointed epigram, a pebble from the sling of Father Tabb's well-provided wit.

Yet he was far from being a morose man, a sullen character. He was gay. Even his muse was one of "quick and capering feet," as Mr. Chesterton has said of the medieval time. There comes readily to mind no poet of like powers whose muse turned so lightly Ariel or Puck. He tells us joy was his favorite playmate. He saw fun almost everywhere, and snared it into

his verse. His last published work was "Quips and Quiddits," but the humorous verse he has written would fill a much larger volume. Satire too was his, caustic or genially cunning, —one thrust and Tabb was through his victim. But it was all in fun,—what he could do in earnest if he wanted to. It makes one believe he would have achieved a different fame had he lived in the time of Pope. Now and then, indeed, he contested in dead seriousness, but even in these tilts his sense of humor did not forsake him. Puns flocked to his pen, they appear with mischief prepense,—the offspring of natural gaiety and an over fertile fancy. Did he have a sense of the ridiculous? A writer[1] has set it down as a conviction that poets lack this lowest sense in "the comic trilogy." The rule is saved, I believe, in the case of Father Tabb. Was it not ludicrous that Father Tabb, as related to us by a living poet, should refuse to see this poet—one of the most charming of companions—when he was lecturing at the college, but should every evening, punctual as the appetite of youth, open the visitor's door and drop within a lump of molasses candy for the lecturer's young son who accompanied him? Yet Father Tabb obviously thought the habit nothing strange, and indeed the living poet found it but interesting. Withal, Father Tabb had an ingenious turn for caricature. But does not the faculty of caricature belong rather to the sense of humor, whereas the sense of the ridiculous begets—the Sunday comic sheet. Wit and humor are in Father Tabb's verse and drawings: one looks in vain for the ridiculous.

I have somewhat insisted on the quaint, familiar side of Father Tabb for the reason that it may be thought non-existent. It finds no voice in the poetry by which he is most widely known. Into that poetry the writer's intimate personality hardly enters. In all his hundreds of lyrics there are, I venture to say, scarcely ten lines so personal that they may be considered autobiographical. Of himself in relation to men he speaks little. "I will lift up mine eyes to the heavens," he seems to

[1] Alice Meynell, *Dublin Review*, January, 1908, "Some Memories of Francis Thompson."

say, and heaven and earth he searched for the beauty of creation. Revelation of self, however, there was in his literary predilections, his devotion to Sidney Lanier and his championship of Edgar Allan Poe, and there is one quatrain at least that acquaints us with his Virginia birth:

IN THE MOUNTAINS OF VIRGINIA.

Nurtured upon my mother's knee,
From this her mountain-breast apart,
Here nearer heaven I seem to be,
And closer to her heart.

Father Tabb published "Poems," "Lyrics," "Child Verse," "Later Lyrics," "Quips and Quiddits" and "Poems," the last being a selection made by Alice Meynell. Most of these lyrics and poems appeared first as contributions to the magazines. Brief, often of appealing thought and always of striking imagery, they excellently answered magazine requirements. All this they had, not lacking the supreme quality without which they should have been tinkling symbols—unbargainable inspiration. Father Tabb's verse is wrought. He employed most often a difficult, though seemingly facile form, the quatrain. By such a choice certain accessories to poetic effect were necessarily foregone. It is accordingly not only quality that gives his verse place, but a special quality, the clear full song finished in one breath, so to speak. Of birds, I have known only the wild canary to sing like that. An example taken almost at random will illustrate:

TO THE BABE NIVA.

Niva, Child of Innocence,
Dust to dust *we* go:
Thou, when Winter wooed thee hence,
Wentest snow to snow.

Mastery of one's art comes, no doubt, with diligent exercise of it, and therein lies a danger. It says no little, therefore, for Father Tabb's integrity as a poet that not one among his many poems seems begotten of this mere ability to make verse.

The sources of his inspiration are not many, but they are deep. He looked for God in nature and bearing God with him

in his own heart he caught through all the world the "unheard music rare" of the Divine Presence. "The eye sees what it brings with it the power of seeing." His eyes were "anoint of nature," and of God. The priest and poet in him were one. The gold thread of his vestment he found woven through the woof of earth and sky; he followed the ritual of the seasons, he knew the rubrics of sunset. Of Autumn he wrote:

Now at the aged Year's decline,
Behold the messenger divine
With Love's celestial countersign—
The sacrament of bread and wine.

Again, she is *Mater Dolorosa:*

Again maternal Autumn grieves,
As blood-like drip the maple leaves
On Nature's Calvary.
And every sap-forsaken limb
Renews the mystery of Him
Who died upon a tree.

The lamb, the sparrow, the lily call to him in their forever-hallowed associations. Childhood's unwithering likeness to the Child divine speaks to the poet most clearly of all. The baby is "An Idolater":

The Baby has no skies
But Mother's eyes;
Nor any God above
But Mother's love.
His Angel sees the FATHER'S face,
But He the Mother's, full of grace;
And yet the Heavenly Kingdom is
Of such as this.

The nurseling dies but it is "Confided":

Another lamb, O Lamb of God, behold,
Within this quiet fold,
Among Thy Father's sheep
I lay to sleep!
A heart that never for a night did rest
Beyond its mother's breast.
Lord, keep it close to Thee,
Lest waking it should bleat and pine for me!

Father Tabb's singing robes were sacerdotal.

Not alone from the founts of sacred knowledge, however, did he derive inspiration. He found matter for song in the truths of science, in nature unprobed and in the adventurings of men. "The Brook," "Meadow Frogs," "Shelley," "Soothsayers" have an unmixed sweet humanity. Can ever explorer answer for us the questions of "The Arctic"?

Is it a shroud or bridal veil
That hides it from our sight,
The lonely sepulchre of Day,
Or banquet-hall of Night?

Are those the lights of revelry
That glimmer o'er the deep,
Or flashes of a funeral pyre
Above the corpse of Sleep?

Beyond those peaks impregnable
Of everlasting snow,
One star—a steadfast beacon—burns
To guard the coast below.

Whence come the ghostly galleons
The pirate Sun to brave,
And furl the shadowy flag of Death
Above a warmer grave?

So might one lengthen the tale of quotations. Mrs. Meynell has carried it to one hundred and twenty pages; the lover of Father Tabb will hardly be satisfied with fewer.

Shorter would a selection be from Father Tabb's lighter verse, at least from that gathered into the two books "Child Verse" and "Quips and Quiddits." Much of the work he did in this vein was never reclaimed by him, indeed, I am persuaded, much of it passed out of his recollection. Worthy to stand with the well-known lines to Andrew Lang is this which I accidentally happened upon in a back number of the London *Academy*. Father Tabb had been charged with too close a resemblance in one of his songs to Davenant, supposedly a natural son of Shakespeare. Father Tabb writes:

If Davenant was Shakespeare's son,
Unless I am mistaken,
Some Donnelly in what I've done
Will find a streak of Bacon.

The lines on Andrew Lang's offence are famous:

TO MR. ANDREW LANG, WHO SPELLED MY NAME 'TAB'

O why should Old Lang Sign
A compliment to me
(If it indeed is mine),
And filch my final b?
To him, as to the Dane
In his soliloquy,
This question comes again,—
"2 b or not 2 b?"

I am convinced that a goodly sheaf of such verses might be gathered from newspapers, magazines and private collections. My own contribution would be the following poem never heretofore printed. There occurred in a quatrain of Father Tabb's, published in the *Notre Dame Scholastic,* a proof reader's mistake for which the guilty but penitent editor apologized to the reverend poet in lines suggesting that a "tabby" would not easily slip its ninefold grip upon life, notwithstanding murderous proof readers. In a few days there came to the editor

A DEFIANCE

So many a line,
Alas, of mine
Has suffered execution,
That to survive
Such fate, and thrive,
Proves deathless constitution.

The earliest stab
To John B. Tabb
The New York *Critic* gave;
But he survives
With *eight* whole lives,
And it is in its grave.

So, blaze away!
And should you slay
A life, I still have seven
In season due
To join the two
Now gone to hell or heaven.

CAT-A-LINE.

Surely a *felix culpa* that occasioned these lines. They are

among the best of Father Tabb's humorous verse, yet of them the author wrote: "My lines—which I cannot, however, recall—you may use as you will." This double power of his in verse remained until the last. Darkened vision brought him no gloom of spirit. In April, 1908, he had in a card to a friend alluded with characteristic cheer to "the blessings of failing sight." Indeed, he made gay verse about his affliction—for was it not "Shade of His hand, outstretched caressingly"?—and no bitterness of spirit is in the beautiful poem which appeared in the *Atlantic Monthly* for August of that year.

GOING BLIND.

Back to the primal gloom
Where life began,
As to my mother's womb,
Must I a man
Return:
Not to be born again,
But to remain;
And in the School of Darkness learn
What mean
"The things unseen."

Unto the last he loved God and took with gladness His gift, life. Really, from One Source flowed the twin silver rivulets of his song.

Father Tabb was taken from St. Charles' to Richmond, Virginia, and there buried in the family vault. The last to look upon his dead face were the eyes of childhood. At a way station where a change of trains was made, the children of the neighboring Catholic school marched a mile to abide with the remains during the wait. There they recited prayers and sang "Lead, Kindly Light," the dead priest's favorite hymn. It was fitting. Father Tabb had been a close friend during life of that other great lover of children, the simple Bishop Curtis, about whose fresh memory the *fioretti* of sanctity already begin to bloom.

Of Father Tabb's place in poetry little need be said. He is in line with the finest tradition of English song: he has affinities with Herbert and Crashaw, with Shelley and with Francis

Thompson. His devotion to the poetry of Poe shows, strange to say, scarcely any trace of influence in his own work, except that there is in both poets a like passion for perfect utterance. Posterity is not to be waylaid of its judgment, but one feels that Father Tabb's poetry will "look Time's leaguer down."

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IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

Some time ago, while propounding his views of immortality, Dr. Lyman Abbott was asked, by a member of his audience, if brute animals have souls. He replied: "I do not think so, for a creature incapable of faith and love cannot have a soul."

It must have been rather disappointing to those at all acquainted with the time honored and profound teaching of the great philosophers and ancients regarding the soul, that Dr. Abbott, a gentleman otherwise scholarly and clever, should have given so unsatisfactory a reply to so vital and pertinent a question. Perhaps it was his intention to ignore in this particular the authority of the thinkers of the past as being obsolete and unequal to the problems of the present. This is often done by modern writers, but never without greater or less disaster. The common reader may not conceive it so; but in the world of science a writer who does not know, or who disregards the psychic teachings of Aristotle, Plato, Socrates, Augustine, and the long line of scholars that followed in the foot-steps of these ancients, is not regarded worthy of serious consideration. No matter what the discoveries and progress of modern science, no matter what the extravagances of rationalism, the greatest thinkers that have ever lived cannot be ignored with impunity.

It is not as if the subject were plain and ordinary, open and subject to the views and reasonings of everyone with a little learning; no, the question of the nature and future condition of the soul is a grave and serious one. It is not easy of solution. The soul of its very essence is, as it were, afar off and obscure to our understanding; it is difficult of access, and hard to conceive; it eludes our senses, and baffles our modes of knowledge, and can be approached only indirectly, as from effect to cause. Hence our views upon the nature and immortality of the soul are to be reckoned according to the authority with which we speak, and the profundity and truth of our reasonings.

It is not the purpose of the present article to be a copy or collection of the opinions and doctrines of the great philosophers, ancient and medieval, respecting the immortality of the soul; but only, while not deviating from the path of the masters to point out and explain the main psychic arguments upon which the belief in immortality may be reasonably and substantially established.

In order to speak intelligently of the incorruptibility or immortality of a soul, it is necessary first of all, and as far as possible, to set before our minds a clear conception of the nature and properties of a soul. No question, however trivial in itself, is possible of proper treatment, unless he who would treat it is able clearly to define its limits. Much less is it possible that a question, of which the author has no definite conception, can be intelligently and satisfactorily comprehended by his readers or hearers. If we set out with obscurity and confusion, it is only natural that we should end in greater confusion. A soul, therefore, is the first and primary principle by which a thing lives, moves, and acts; or it is the underlying source and fountain of life, thought, and intrinsic action in all these things, be they human, animal, or vegetable, in which these vital attributes are found. Any being, then, or any entity which lives and moves, whether by conscious or unconscious movement, whether its movement be intelligent or instinctive, is said to be endowed with a soul. From this it is evident that not only human beings possess a soul, but also animals and plants,—every living creature from the highest intelligence to the simplest shrub that grows. The differences, so vast and varied, which we perceive in various living beings is the result and, to a certain extent, an explanation of the different principles that vivify them. Hence the vegetative soul, which, in plants and trees, and all insensible living things, is the source only of unconscious life and motion, greatly differs from the sensitive soul which is the principle of animal life, sensibility (feeling), instinct, and a certain unintelligent and limited consciousness in brute animals. As the sensitive soul is far more perfect than the vegetative, so an animal in the order of nature is a being of vastly greater perfection and

capabilities than the mere plant. All note this striking difference, even though they do not understand, or admit that its source is the principle within. But between the vegetative and sensitive souls, and the intellectual principle in man there is a difference still more notable. The soul of man rises to a far higher plane of being. If not in the same degree, it contains all the virtues and properties found in the souls of animal and vegetative life, and is gifted in addition with intellectuality.

There is nobody who does not know that man has within him an intellectual principle which is called his soul, and yet there are not a few who do not understand that this intellectual principle must by reason of its intellectuality be spiritual and incorruptible. The connection between intellectuality and spirituality is not sufficiently plain to all to demonstrate that he who has an intellect must by consequence have a spiritual and immortal soul. To show this connection we need only briefly examine the psychic operations which proceed from man. With the soul itself we cannot directly proceed; for while the soul is the seat and source of man's life and action, of his intelligence and sensibility, thought and feeling, it does not act, directly and immediately, but indirectly, as through the medium of the senses, and its spiritual faculties. We feel, we hear and see, we taste and smell by means of the senses, but we think and understand, remember and exercise our will not directly by the soul, but through its faculties, the intellect, will and memory. It is by these faculties that the soul exercises its highest and noblest operations and functions,—distinguishing and elevating itself above all other things of earth,—becoming like to the nature of angels, and it is through these same lofty operations and properties that we arrive, as by an indirect method, at a knowledge and understanding of the nature of the soul of man. This has been the process of all the great philosophers, and it is the only natural way by which we can enter the sanctuary of the human soul. The classic axiom says that we know the nature and essence of a thing by its proper operations; that is, by those operations which are particular and distinctive of the thing that operates. It is not, therefore, every act elicited

by a being that determines its specific nature. Thus man elicits many acts, he is the subject of a multitude of different operations sharply distinguishable one from the other: he feels and thinks, reasons and vegetates; and yet not by each and all of these actions is he strictly distinguished as a man. The plant vegetates and grows, and the animal is capable of feeling; but neither plant nor animal can think or reason. The power to think and reason is peculiar to man; and it is only by these and similar acts that we are able to recognize in man a principle vastly different from that which animates other living creatures.

But from the operations of the intellect and will which determine man's specific nature, and manifest him an intellectual being how does it follow that he must possess an immortal spirit? We already understand in part that the specific acts of a creature determine and specify the nature of the source or principle from which they proceed, but we do not see how these acts in the case of man argue the spirituality or immortality of his soul. A slight investigation will show it. Let us then briefly examine these specific operations. That they are spiritual in character appears at once when we reflect that the objects with which they deal, or at least with which they are capable of dealing, are spiritual objects. Perhaps this is not at first quite plain; but, whether it be that all our knowledge comes to us by way of the senses, as most philosophers contend, or that we are born with certain innate ideas and conceptions, it is at any rate beyond doubt that, from the material objects which confront the senses, the intellect abstracts those immaterial and universal ideas and notions which furnish its knowledge. I see a horse, a tree, or flower, and my mind at once and unconsciously gathers from this particular sensible object of color, form, and shape, a general and universal notion of horse, tree, or flower. Under the particular material object perceived by the senses the intellect conceives the universal nature which is participated by the object before the senses and applicable to every other similar object. Once conceived, the idea is stamped upon the intellect in its pure abstract universality, so that, though the same object never again meets the senses,

the mind can understand it, reflect upon it, and reason about it. The process is the same in regard to every material object apprehended by the senses; but the mind in its range of knowledge is not confined within the limits of sensibility. Its sweep is over a far vaster field. Starting with those things which strike the senses, it ranges from the humblest form of matter into the highest regions of abstraction and spirituality. It can understand to a great measure things purely spiritual, entirely independent of time and space, and of the material creation. It can reason about and designate the nature and attributes of souls separated from the body, of angels; and even the nature of God, surpassing all understanding, falls in a limited way within the domain of its powers.

Now from these capabilities of man's intellect, inadvertently realized every moment, we come to know the existence and nature of the human soul, precisely as a spiritual principle. Behind the intellectual faculty which can rise in an instant from the things of matter and sense to the realms of entire abstraction and purest spirituality, we perceive there must be a spiritual source, greater naturally than the faculty proceeding from it. If the soul, through the intellect, can deal with things spiritual, then it must of necessity be spiritual in its own nature. A stream cannot of itself rise higher than its source. The ear can never perceive color, nor the eye sound, simply because these senses, like the other faculties, cannot exceed the limits of their nature. In like manner brute animals, though wonderfully endowed with those instinctive tendencies which make for their own well-being and that of their kind, can never rise above material objects. Of all things, then, in the order of nature, the soul of man alone, ranging over the universe, seeking its end and perfection in myriad wondrous ways and forms, fixing its hopes and aspirations in regions of perpetuity and immutability, proves that it is of a nature unlike the limited changing things of earth.

Allowing therefore, that man is endowed with a soul spiritual in character it follows by an easy and natural consequence that it must also be incorruptible or immortal. Death is nothing more than the separation of matter and its principle of life.

If any material thing that lives can remain forever united to that which gives it life, whatsoever it may be called, that thing can never die. It is the going out of the spark of life, the departure of the vivifying source from plant, animal, or man that brings on the calamity of death. If, then, the principle itself of life and action be itself free from material elements and not dependent upon the matter it vivifies, if it shows by its operations that it is superior to all time and place, how can it ever succumb to dissolution; how can it die? Science, indeed, does not know, reason cannot tell. As far as we know, as far as the greatest thinkers have been able to determine, a being, such as we have described, once put into existence must live on forever. But some one may say, there are other ways perhaps, unknown to us now, by which a spiritual being of its own inclination will finally enter the portals of death. We do not know all the secrets of life and death; mystery darkens upon mystery, the human mind is unable to penetrate the gloom, and hence the spirit itself, and last of all perhaps, will yield to "dusty death."

It is very true that many things exist which we know not, and many more which we do not understand and cannot explain. Nature is replete with wonders too extensive and too intricate for our comprehension; but after all, we know something; we have certain knowledge regarding many things, and in view of the vast unexplored fields which ever deepen before us, we must be humble. Because we do not know all mysteries we must not fall into the absurdity of skepticism and doubt about everything; we should be content with what we already know, and hold fast to it, while moving on to what we do not know. It would be to no purpose to discard what we have, what we are sure of, while seeking that which we have not, and perhaps can never get. The human reason, so keen, so penetrating, so unfailing in its final universal judgments, wrought up and perfected through all the ages has told us by the mouth and pen of the most eminent philosophers in all times that the spirit within us, is like to angelic, that it defies the trammels of time and space, that it mocks the idea of death and dissolution and seeks in immortal life an incorruptible throne where it is to reign without end.

Following upon the knowledge and dictates of the human intellect the next most potent reason for the belief in the immortality of the soul is the universal desire of mankind at all places to live forever. This does not, however, form an independent argument; it is but a consequence upon that presented by the nature of our intellectual operations. The will, or source of our desires is a blind faculty; it follows in all things the guidance of the intellect. We can have no desire for that of which we have no conception. For those singular and unknown treasures which lie concealed in sea or mountain, or in the depths of the earth, we have only the most general and indeterminate wish, because our knowledge of them is only general and vague.

But setting aside the intimate connection between our desires and our knowledge, and insisting solely upon our will and its volitions, philosophers tell us it is impossible that so far reaching, so universal, and vital a desire as that of the human heart for immortality, should be vain and unfounded. Nature, they insist, never acts in vain; *i. e.,* the great natural impulses and instincts in man or brute are not and cannot be false; they must have a definite and certain meaning founded upon the reality of things; they must be possible of realization. To what purpose should the all wise Creator implant in the bosom of man the impulse and desire to conserve and perpetuate himself in life, if this were utterly impossible, or never to be realized? Why should man be worn and tormented with passion for wealth, power, and position, if there be no such thing as ever attaining to their acquisition? If, like the pangs of a burdened unrepenting conscience, they are ever haunting us, and can never be banished, never be satisfied, and put to rest? In the same way, and with more reason may we ask the cause of the ceaseless surging longings of the soul, of those impassioned desires for that higher and nobler life which we find not here below? For that state of perfect happiness and rest from toil and pain and sorrow? Whence these insatiable cravings for a life in which we can realize all our noblest dreams and hopes in immortal unblemished youth and vigor? There must be such a state which awaits us, else our life is a dream and our hopes and longings vain and useless!

It can not be doubted that, by exercise of the intellect and imagination, one may construct scenes of impossible pleasure and happiness, if not in an absolute sense, perhaps in a relative and restricted one, in as much as the things one may fancy lie outside one's personal reach. One may picture to himself a fair state of life, with health and wealth, and length of days; with peace from without, and joy within; with all the charms of home, of beauty, love and devotion unmarred by frown or care:—or again, as in time of buoyant ecstatic exultation, when the "tide of life is at its flood," and youth and strength, and grace of figure appear to crush and still the pangs of nature, one may wish the impossible; that the day of life, so fair, so sweet, so full of choicest good, might linger on forever. It is true, that these and such like ideal and enchanting conditions of life often cast a longing lingering spell about the human heart, and, in some instances, lead it captive for a time; but never in the history of man have they been recognized as constituting an essential and universal desire of human nature. On the contrary thousands upon thousands of souls in all ages have despised these passing fitful pleasures and comforts of life in view of the immortality for which they looked and hoped beyond the grave. Joy and sorrow have alike been reckoned as naught in comparison with the glory of immortality. There is no desire so universal and essential to human nature as that of living, here in this time and hereafter, forever. Even those who, by a careless and negligent life, manifest no strong wish for future unending existence do not the less ardently desire it, if only they could be assured of its certainty. The desire, strong, yes stronger than life or death, is there, but doubt and uncertainty muffle its cry.

Many worthy writers have been persuaded of the immortality of the soul by the perfectibility of the human intellect. Considering that the mind, or intellect of man can never attain, during the years of this life, to its adequate perfection; that, at the close of a long life, the intellect of the cleverest and most extensive student has but started on the way of its perfection; that, in fact, to reach the fulness of its perfectibility, the spirit of man would require an eternity of existence, the

ablest psychologists have concluded that the soul must be immortal. All other beings save man can find in this world the fulness of perfection which their nature demands. They have their day, they run their course, and cease to be. Unless, then, we say that man, the climax and crown of the natural order, is in the end the greatest failure of all things created, we cannot evade the conclusion of the immortality of his soul.

This beautiful argument might be much further developed, but since it would ultimately resolve itself into what has already been said in reference to the operations of the intellect and will, it is not our purpose to dwell longer upon it. We offer our humble thoughts upon this sublime subject to the consideration of our readers, and trust they may give some solace to the doubting uncertain mind, and pluck from the heaving breast of grief something of the sting and sorrows of death. The body—this mortal clay, which the spirit quickens, will of necessity yield to decrepitude and decay, and be resolved into its elements; but the soul, strong, immortal, and imperishable as when it came from the hand of God, shall live forever.

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NOTES ON EDUCATION.

Literature in the Primary Grades.

In the last number of the *Bulletin* we had occasion to examine the methods of instruction employed by primary teachers and embodied in primary text-books, in which the formal or the drill element was dominant. Under whatever name these methods are known, whether as alphabet methods, phonic methods, key methods, word methods, or phonic-word methods, they tend to produce very undesirable results which may, for the most part, be summed up under two heads, discouragement and loss of faith on the part of the children in what books have to yield, and the cultivation of a mental habit of looking at the words instead of through them at the thought. The worst effects of these methods, however, do not appear in the primary grades, but in the upper grammar grades and later where the habits generated by faulty methods in the primary grades prevent the children from readily grasping the thought that lies back of the printed page. One of the clearest demands growing out of the recent developments in child study and genetic psychology has been for a radical change in the primary methods of teaching language and literature. This, of course, applies to both teachers and text-books. In *Education* for November, 1909, Mr. Kilpatrick has a few valuable editorial paragraphs on this subject: "It is well to bear in mind that the general public regard English, when the child first enters school, as the one all important subject. This valuation will doubtless be unquestioned by any serious-minded teacher. But it is quite possible that most people have not fully realized that English is necessarily being both taught and learned as a component part of every school exercise. In this respect it is completely differentiated from all other branches of study. This constant application of the vernacular should be made a real source of

its proper mastery. If this use could be effectively employed, very great saving in time for the elementary course would result. English for the sake of English is and always will be a dull study in the elementary school. There is only one way to learn good English, and that is to live it, and to constantly associate with it, and correct speech and composition will follow as light follows the sun."

We entirely agree with this statement of Mr. Kilpatrick. English and literature should, of course, be taught as separate subjects at the proper time, just as Christian Doctrine and science and aesthetics should be taught as separate subjects in the proper time, but the first grades of the elementary school is not the proper time for any of these subjects to be taught separately. In this phase of the child's mental development unity and close correlation are the great needs and they cannot be sacrificed without injury to his future mental development. The teachers and the text-books must adjust themselves to this state of affairs. But let us listen further to Mr. Kilpatrick: "Literature needs not so much teaching as it does living. Literature that cannot stand alone is not literature; it is trash. So the burden of the literature work in the elementary school is to present proper material for children to read and literature that they will read. The greatest error of the past in this matter has been that adult literature has been offered to little children. They have refused to take it, and so a skilled literature physician has been called in to administer the dose. We who have taught know the result. But alas! some times we have been called upon to play the rôle of surgeon, and without even an anaesthetic, we have had to cut in pieces in cold blood a beautiful adult classic. Our little children have been encouraged to run down each historical or geographical allusion as if it were a new remedy. Nor is this all, for we have dissected each cold part by a rigid grammatical analysis or by a rhetorical cynosure. And this—all in the name of literature for children! Literature for children is too beautiful to flay in this manner; too simple to so contort; too sweet in its beneficent influence upon children to throw a scalpel in the way of

a message that prefers to whisper its sweetest notes in the quiet of children's hour."

Here we have set forth very clearly the chief characteristic of the new readers that are demanded for our primary grades in the name of genetic psychology and in the name of experience, let it be added. Primary readers must not consist of dry drills in spelling and diacritical marks and pronunciation, in phonics and key-words, nor must they be made up of excerpts from adult literature. The demand is clearly for a content that will be child-literature in the true sense of that word, for a literature that will express the child to himself. Is such a literature in existence? If not, it must be created. Truths must be presented to the child in form and language that will reach his comprehension and these truths must be such as will touch the deepest springs in his conscious life and that will arouse and guide his sentiments and emotions, that will awaken his desire for a deeper insight and give him courage to overcome whatever difficulties may beset his path. That the task here outlined for the authors of primary books is difficult will be admitted at once by all who have given the matter serious consideration. It is difficult for the adult to put himself wholly in the child's position and to look out through the child's eyes upon the world of truth and beauty that surrounds us, and this difficulty is enormously increased by the limitation of the child's capacity to recognize thought in its written form. This necessitates the closest grading in the words and sentences employed. In recent years many attempts have been made to produce text-books under the stimulation of this ideal and it becomes the duty of those entrusted with the selection of the primary text-books used in our schools to judge of the relative merits of these books. All of these books aim at keeping the content in the foreground and the formal element in a secondary place, and in so far they all deserve commendation from a pedagogical standpoint. Now, if we were indifferent to the nature of the thought material given to the child during his first years in school, we might turn our attention exclusively to the effectiveness of the

various books as means of developing the child's power and love of reading, as we did when discussing, in the last number of the *Bulletin,* the primary text-books that placed the formal drills in the foreground. But, to arouse the child's interest in any line of thought is to affect his life profoundly, and hence before a book can be considered at all as an available text-book for our children, we must ascertain the nature of the thought material which it contains and we must consider the effect which it is likely to produce upon the children.

All students of psychology are familiar with the fact that every cognitive state contains a dynamo-genetic element. Every thought tends to realize itself in action. Of course this tendency varies as you pass from an abstract idea down to a vivid mental picture of some concrete action and it also varies with the age and development of the pupil. The younger the child is the more pronounced is this tendency of the cognitive state to realize itself in action. Furthermore, as the young child has little or no power of abstraction, the dynamo-genetic content of his conscious states is doubly intense, combining as it does the dynamo-genetic elements arising from the concreteness of the ideas and the youth of the thinker. Clearly, therefore, the utmost care must be exercised in the selection of appropriate material for child-literature, for even making good readers of the children would avail little if in so doing we bent their lives in wrong directions. "For what doth it profit a man to gain the whole world if he lose his own soul?"

Play Readers.

Children are notoriously fond of play and it is not a matter for surprise, therefore, that some writers of primary books, wholly intent upon making the thought the dominant element, should turn to children's games for the material of the child's first readers. That some of these have succeeded as readers will be readily conceded by all who are familiar with the primary classrooms of to-day, but many educators question the wisdom of the plan on account of the effect which these readers have on the development of the child's character. "All work

and no play makes Jack a dull boy," but all play and no work makes Jack a useless boy, and the complaint has gone up from all parts of the country that too many of the latter type of Jacks are being developed in our schools. Moreover, the plan is unpsychological in so far as it inverts the natural relationship which play bears to the child's life. It is like planting a tree with the blossoms in the earth and the roots in the air. Play has its legitimate function in the child's life, and it is a large and important function, but it should be remembered that even the child tires of too much play. He plays teacher, or father, or mother, or soldier, but only that he may understand something of these adult attitudes of mind, and once he has attained this through his game, his tendency is to turn his newly acquired knowledge to account in the practical affairs of life. The play instinct and the imitative instinct are closely associated in the child's life. The lessons which he learns through their combined function are for the serious affairs of his life; they help him to adjust himself to the people of his environment and open up for him channels of intelligent communication with the adult world. In all this play is but a means to an end and not an end in itself, however unconscious the child may be of this relationship. Of course the child's instincts are wider and wiser than his individual consciousness. The pressure back of them is made up of centuries of race experience. That the child is not conscious of play as a means to an end in no way affects this fact. The child's relationship to food, clothing, protection, the love of father and mother,—these constitute the deepest elements of his conscious life, and play merely enhances their value for him. In the literature which aims at expressing the child to himself these elements must constitute the nucleus of every drama and it is precisely here that the books we are discussing fail.

Nature Study Readers.

Another group of writers has made nature the dominant element in the child's first readers. The birds and the flowers, the cats and dogs and ponies, the sheep and the wolves and

the bears, these are all made the child's companions and his sympathies for them and fellowship with them are made the basic elements of his mental and moral development. The element of play is usually added, and in most instances it is made the means of furthering the child's knowledge of nature and of deepening his sympathy with the lower forms of life. That there is good in this is scarcely open to question and it is, as far as it goes, in strict conformity with child nature.

Joseph Lee, in an excellent article in the *Educational Review*, November, 1909, under the title The Boy Who Goes to Work, has many things to say which bear on one phase of this subject. In speaking of fitting the boy to the world, he says: "Then there is the nurturing instinct that makes every little girl nurse her doll, that impels every child to acquire and care for plants and pets, that makes them love to tend the horse, feed the pigs, or milk the cow. This instinct also we sterilize by permitting very meager opportunity, or none at all, for its expression. Allowed its natural scope it would have made a nurse, a teacher, a fosterer of life, of every child." Mr. Lee then goes on to point out the adverse conditions of our city life which starve out the best instincts of the child's nature. "The only part of our children's nature that now gains executive expression—that is to say, actual liberation into the world of action—is the barbaric part. For the running and fighting plays that can be carried on in the street or on the playground, and do not require tools or much material, some sort of opportunity exists—very imperfect, it is true, but far better than can be found, at least in the case of the city child, for quiet play in satisfaction of the nurturing, creative, or scientific instincts. In our civilized life it is the civilized productive side of the child's nature that gets wholly starved." That these instincts are deathless and when denied one form of expression will seek and find other forms is developed in the article from which we have been quoting. "So the nurturing instinct, which begins from mother love, has worked back from that original utterance until it has permeated our whole nature. We are nurturers now, both sexes,

and for every kind of work that deals with the fostering of life. The instinct makes not only teachers, nurses, doctors, farmers, but molders of men in every sort of occupation. A leading banking house I know is in all essentials a kindergarten of young business men, the expression of the mother nature of its head. Even successful generals, like the successful captains of athletic teams, are often affectionately known as 'father' or even as 'Old Mother So-and-So.'"

Evidently nature study has much more to give the child than a basis for the study of systematic botany and zoology. It has more to accomplish than the mere prevention of cruelty to animals. Where the work is properly conducted, it brings the child's whole nature under the control of fundamental life laws that tend to strengthen his whole being and to shape his conduct and his aspirations in accordance with laws which the Creator has planted in the hearts of his creatures. That these objects may be accomplished far better through such primary readers as we are here discussing than through such foolish legislation as that recently enacted by the State of Illinois is evident. We cannot forbear quoting here a passage from the *Dial* commenting on this Illinois law. "Our second law, the one that makes humane instruction compulsory in all the Illinois schools, is a legislative 'freak' which it is difficult to discuss seriously. All competent moralists are agreed that the one way *not* to be employed in developing the ethical instincts is the way of direct precept at stated periods. Yet in the present instance one particular sort of moral training is singled out, and is to be forced down the throats of all the young people at school in weekly doses of half-hour size (although daily six-minute doses are considerately permitted as an alternative) and this process is to be continued *ad nauseam* from the kindergarten to the college. A plan better calculated to dull the moral consciousness and make the sympathies callous could hardly have been devised, and in the very name of humanity which the misguided sponsors of this law seek to foster we enter our protest against it. Moreover, not content with securing its primary aim of universal instruction in this subject,

the law makes the drastic requirement that the instruction shall be given by every teacher in every school supported by public taxation in the state, enforcing the requirement by the penalty of a heavy fine for non-compliance." Another passage in this same article in the *Dial,* bearing on this subject, should be considered here. "Through the efforts of well-meaning people, whose judgment is as faulty as their intentions are good, a considerable number of our states have long been burdened with laws imposing upon their schools a cast-iron requirement concerning the teaching of physiology with reference to the use of alcohol and tobacco. The mischievous ingenuity of these laws is almost beyond belief. They demand that certain dogmas be enforced upon children with the most damnable iteration year after year,—dogmas that even a child's experience knows to be unsound; and they make it almost impossible for text-books of physiology written in scientific language to be used in public schools. Men of science are practically unanimous in condemning these requirements, but the fanatics and doctrinaires have their way with the legislatures, and the voice of reason avails for nothing. Thus science is discredited, the canker of insincerity affects the teacher's work and reasonable admonition against the evils of intemperance misses its opportunity altogether."

If the children are to be taught to know the plant and animal life around them, if their nurturing instincts are to be developed so as to render them humane in the treatment of man and beast, if their knowledge of hygiene and physiology is to be of any practical benefit to them, in the cultivation of the virtue of temperance and in promoting public health, evidently the right place to begin the work is in the primary grades. This both the child's present development and the environment into which he must enter on leaving school imperatively demand, but there is another side to the picture.

Is the child to know no higher teacher than the beasts of the field? Truly we have in all this movement a pathetic spectacle of the condition to which our primary schools are reduced by the suppression of religious teaching. We must build up in

the children standards of morality, but, according to these educators, the only means of doing so at our disposal is to point to the morality of the dogs and cats. The nature study readers, therefore, are right as far as they go, but, as in the case of the play readers, they do not go far enough. What in the nature of things should be a means to an end they have made the end. In every living thing the child should be taught to see the handiwork of his Father who is in Heaven. The child should learn to nurture the weak things that surround him because his Father in Heaven created them. Every beauty in the world should reveal the greater beauty of the invisible Creator. We are not here blaming the authors of these text-books for omitting entirely God and the hereafter, for drawing an impenetrable veil over the unseen world; their books could not be used in our public schools were this not done. Our concern here, however, is not primarily with the text-books designed for use in the public schools, where this serious limitation is imposed by law. The Catholic school exists precisely for the teaching of religion and if it is a matter of the first importance that nature study be introduced into the primary readers so as to develop the child's nurturing instinct, it is a matter of supreme importance that religion should take its place in the primary text-books but not side by side with nature, for God is not to be understood at all if placed on the same level with nature. To satisfy the essential requirements for a Catholic school the primary text-book must present God and religion as its central element and everything else in the book must be subordinated to this and presented to the child in its true relationship of dependence.

The Culture Epoch Readers.

The play readers and the nature study readers which we have been considering fail to reach the requirements of primary text-books for Catholic schools because of what they omit; their fault is chiefly negative. But the converse of this is true of the culture epoch readers, which sin positively not only

against the teachings of religion but against humanity and common decency. If it were not for the fact that these books have been so highly recommended and that they are at present so widely used in our public schools, we might point out a few of their main defects and pass them by. But they are of for too great importance for many reasons to render such treatment permissable. To facilitate clearness and brevity of treatment, it seems wisest to select one typical series of these readers for our analysis. I have taken for this purpose The Industrial and Social History Series, by Katherine Elizabeth Dopp, Ph. D., of the University of Chicago. It should, however, be understood that these books represent not the average but the extreme development of the objectionable features to which we have referred. The books themselves should be carefully examined by all who are interested in the subjects here under discussion. They constitute so wide a departure from the accepted children's text-books of the past as to be almost unintelligible through any brief description. They are founded on certain fundamental assumptions with which every Christian, or at least every Catholic, must take issue. These are first, that man is the lineal descendant of the brute from whom he differs only in degree; secondly, that the only valid standard of morality is that derived through experience in the struggle for existence by the race in its slow ascent from the brute state; thirdly, that the child must arrive at his moral standards not through external authority but through individual experience which should, in the main, repeat the race experience; fourthly, that the child should be fully informed concerning the mysteries of life, etc., even at the earliest school age there must be no reserves; fifthly, there must be no authority to enforce any standard of conduct upon the child; finally, the child must wait until he grows up to adult stature before he is made familiar with civilized standards of art, literature, science, or morality.

It seems highly improbable on the face of it that any sane person would attempt to construct a series of text-books for use in the primary grades along the lines here laid down, and

granting that the books are produced, it seems incredible that any intelligent school superintendent or principal would tolerate their presence in the school. But the facts in this case are stranger than fiction; the impossible has happened. These books were written by a professor in the University of Chicago, they are published by Rand, McNally & Company, and they are in actual use in a great number of schools in various parts of the United States. And, if the books themselves be appealed to, the first thing that will attract the attention of the student is the long array of learned authorities who are cited in support of the very principles which we have here pointed out. It is stated in the preface that the books were largely due to the inspiration and direction of Professor John Dewey, formerly of Chicago University and now helping to shape the policy of Teachers College, Columbia University. Moreover, the series of books in question constitute an excellent concrete embodiment of the educational creed that is at present shaping the policy of our public schools in many parts of the country and their existence alone should be sufficient to make all who are responsible for Catholic primary education pause before admitting into our schools text-books that have no other recommendation than the fact that they are being used in the neighboring public school.

Apart altogether from the religious aspects of the question the books before us are objectionable from a purely scientific standpoint. They are constructed along the lines of an erroneous form of the culture epoch theory, which assumes that the right way to proceed with the education of a child is to make him function successively in each phase of race development. For a justification of this procedure an appeal is made to the embryological doctrine that ontogeny is a recapitulation of phylogeny. Now, the doctrine in question is purely anatomical and even if its full truth were admitted, it says nothing more than that the various organs of the animal were unfolded successively in race history and that the same sequence obtains in the organic development of each individual. In race history, it is claimed that the function creates the structure and that

the structure was not created for the function, as was formerly assumed. Thus in the course of race development the eye was made by seeing, the lung by breathing, etc. But no one acquainted with the elements of embryology would assume for a moment that the functioning of embryonic structures plays any part whatever in the development of the individual. He is carried forward through the whole developmental series by the mother. The individual begins to function when at birth he reaches the adult plane, and not until then. In race history the eye may have been made by seeing and the lung by breathing but it is absurd to suppose that any such thing occurs in the individual unfolding. It is true that in those lowly forms of life in which the young pass through one or more functional larval phases before the adult plane is reached several physiological phases may be included in the recapitulation. Thus the young frog functions for a time as a tadpole and the insect lingers on the way as a grub, but it should be remembered that this delaying by the way prevents these creatures from becoming anything more than frogs or bugs. If the young mammal, while passing through the ancestral phase that employed gills for aeration, were removed from its mother's womb and thrown into the water, it would suffocate, owing to the inadequate development of its gills, even if it could otherwise be kept alive.

Now, the culture epoch theory as embodied in the series of readers we are here discussing assumes that the mental life of the child passes through a series of developmental phases paralleling ancestral race history and it furthermore assumes, and this is the chief point of our present objection, that the right way to proceed with the child's education is to begin with the early savage phases and make him function successively in each phase of race history until he finally reaches the adult plane. But in the light of biology this would be a very effective means of retarding his mental development and of preventing him from ever reaching the plane of civilized life. Everywhere we find nature busy suppressing ancestral form and function in early developmental phases; she hurries the young through the history of a million years in the short space

of a few weeks, in order to hasten his arrival on the highest plane attained by his race, and these educators would reverse this process by holding the child as long as possible in the early phases of race life. The net result of such a policy is to lower man to the savage plane. It is pertinent to ask here what percentage of the retardation, so much complained of in our schools to-day, and of the juvenile crime and hoodlumism which has recently disgraced our school population, is due to the effective carrying out of this erroneous form of the culture epoch theory.

Katherine Dopp and the other protagonists of the culture epoch theory are not content with assuming a savage ancestry for our children. They assume a brute origin. At the age of six the child is supposed to be passing through a phase represented in history by the so-called pleistocene man and he is required to spend his first year in school with the mythical tree-dwelling ancestors of man. There is not a gleam of light in the gruesome pages of these books. They are profusely illustrated, but the pictures are those of beasts and brutalized human beings. In these books there is no play of fancy, no joyous scenes, neither hope, nor love, nor heroism; it is the ape and tiger phase of existence; there is no family life, no society, no cultivation of the soil. The mother has offspring as other animals do and when the young are able to find food for themselves they are pushed out to make room for others. They do not know fire and consequently eat wild roots and raw flesh while it is still throbbing with life, and find their only protection from the wolves and bears in the trees. While the world here portrayed is the product of the dreams of certain evolutionists, it is given to the children and their teachers with all the outward show of proof and scientific authority as if the author of the book had lived through the scenes and taken snap-shot pictures of the tree-dwellers and their doings. And yet this monstrous imposition on the credulity of our primary teachers and of the little children is permitted and even applauded by many of our educational leaders.

Before entering upon any further discussion of the vicious

principles embodied in these culture epoch readers it will be best to examine a few specimen pages of the books. The first book of the series is entitled The Tree Dwellers, the second The Early Cave Dwellers, the third The Late Cave Dwellers, the fourth The Tent Dwellers. These four books are supposed to furnish forth the mental diet of the child for the first four years of his school life and to supply the moral atmosphere in which his young life is to be shaped. The Tree Dwellers opens with the picture of Sharp Tooth, the heroine, chasing a rabbit for her breakfast. We are told that she is squat, and red-haired, her nails have grown into long claws, her hair is wild and unkempt. This savage ancestress is naked, except for a cloudy breech-cloth. The next scene presents Sabre Tooth, an extinct member of the tiger family, chasing Sharp Tooth for his breakfast. They are six of one and half-a-dozen of the other. The woman seeking to devour the rabbit is a beast in no respect superior to the beast that seeks to devour her, except, perhaps, that she can climb a tree and thus escape his claws and teeth, just as the rabbit by burrowing may have escaped hers. Then a child is born to her, Bodo, the hero of the story. There are no fathers in those days. His mother tends him in his cradle made in the branches of a tree. When he is able to find wild roots for himself or to catch and devour birds or other animals, he is pushed out to make room for other babies. Lesson Twenty presents him in company with another boy of his own age. They chase some animal in the hope of obtaining a meal, until night overtakes them, then they climb into a tree for safety and go to sleep. In the morning they come down from the tree where they had spent the night to find their breakfast. The lesson ends with this passage: "There is nothing there, says One Ear. Bodo knew better. He noticed a hump among the leaves. He reached out his hand and touched it. It was a little calf that had been hidden there by its mother. It scarcely moved as Bodo touched it. Its mother had taught it to lie still. Many people might have passed it by. But Bodo had sharp eyes, and besides he was very hungry. So the boys killed the calf and began to eat the

raw flesh. They ate until they were satisfied. Then they played among the trees."

Now, as we have pointed out above, every mental picture tends to realize itself in action, and, moreover, this tendency is particularly strong in childhood. One cannot fail to see, therefore, what the effect of such scenes as are here depicted would be on the boy of six. What is the use of legislating, as they do in Illinois, to secure the development of the nurturing instinct in our children so that they may love and care for dependent animals, when these books, published in Chicago, and put into the hands of the children, systematically develop the opposite tendencies? And lest the pictures and the text should fail to realize themselves in the child's conduct, each of these blood-curdling, gruesome scenes is dramatized by the children. Here are the instructions which follow the lesson given above. "Things to do. Choose somebody to be Bodo and somebody to be One Ear, and let them show how the boys found the calf. Model a calf in clay." As the work proceeds these gruesome scenes become more elaborate and the dramatization is carried on in greater detail.

Chapter Four of the second book, The Early Cave Men, gives an account full of revolting details of the killing of Sabre Tooth by the clan. They watched the beast, who was glutted with the flesh of his victims of the night before, as he crawled into the thicket. "Strong Arm went to look at Sabre Tooth again. The creature was sleeping heavily. He was lying just under a strong spreading branch of an old oak." The details are then given of how Strong Arm climbed up into the tree and tied a long spear to the branch and then tied a bag of stones to the spear as it hung over the sleeping beast. When all was ready he cut the strap that fastened the spear to the branch and let it fall, with its load of stones, so as to pierce through the body of Sabre Tooth. The picture of Sabre Tooth in his death agony, transfixed by this crude spear, is here given. The lesson ends with the following directions. "Things to do. Notice how gracefully the cat moves. Notice how it gets ready to spring. Think of an animal many times larger than the

cat and see if you can model Sabre Tooth in clay. See if you can find good stones for hunting knives and spears. Name a tool or a machine that you have seen in which a weight is used. Draw a picture of it." And yet the State of Illinois, while permitting the use of such books as these, compels, under penalty of a heavy fine, every teacher to devote one half-hour of the children's time each week to cultivating the spirit of kindliness to dumb beasts. Here is work for the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. But the books in question do not content themselves with destroying the attitude of kindliness towards animals, and with making butchers and pig stickers of the children, it proceeds to level man down to the brute and to develop attitudes whose legitimate end can scarcely stop short of rapine and murder. We give lessons five and six in full here so as to let the readers judge for themselves the effect which these books are likely to have upon the children who are compelled to use them in school.

V.

Things to Think About

What do you think the Cave-men will do with Sabre Tooth's skin? What will they do with his teeth and claws? What will they do with his flesh? Can you think of what they might do with the bones? How do you think they learned to cook food?

Preparations for the Feast

How excited all the people on the hills were when they knew that Sabre Tooth had been killed! Everybody wanted to see him. Young and old crowded around to see the monster as he lay stretched out on the ground. They gazed at the creature in silence. They admired his rich tawny stripes. Not a man on the hills had ever before been able to get such a skin. They all wished that they might have it, but they knew that it belonged to Strong Arm. They examined the two large sabre

teeth. They felt of the smaller teeth and claws. At length the men began to quarrel about trophies, but Strong Arm waved them back. He claimed one sabre tooth for himself and allowed the other to go to the brave old man. When Strong Arm spoke the men kept silent, for they knew that the trophies belonged to the bravest men. But they were given a share of the smaller teeth and claws. While they were loosening them with stone hammers, the women were hunting for their stone knives. They were soon busy taking off Sabre Tooth's beautiful skin. When the heavy skin was off, they began to get ready for the feast. They ate pieces of raw flesh while they worked, and tossed pieces to the men and boys. They were all too hungry to wait for the feast. Besides, they were used to eating raw meat. But they had learned how to cook meat at this time. They had learned to roast meat in hot ashes. At first they roasted it in its skin, but now they knew a better way. They skinned the animal and cut out the ribs. Then they buried them in the hot ashes. They covered the ashes with hot coals. They cut slices of meat with their stone knives and put them on roasting sticks. Then they held these sticks over the hot coals, just as we sometimes do to-day.

Things to do

Make believe that you are doing some of the work that the Cavemen did, and see if anyone can guess what it is. See if you can cook something over the coals. Ask someone to read you a story that Charles Lamb wrote about roast pig.

Things to Think About

How do you think the Cavemen would act at a feast? What would they use for dishes? What would they do to entertain themselves and their neighbors? When would the neighbors go home?

The Feast

Nobody knew just when the feast began. Nobody set the table for there was no table to set. But the women brought bowls they had made out of hollow gourds. Before the meat was half cooked everybody was eating. Some ate thick slices that had been partly roasted on the sharp sticks. Others chewed raw meat from bones which they tore from the carcass. The children sucked strips of raw meat and picked the scraps from the ground. When the women lifted the ribs out of the hot ashes they found a nice gravy. They dipped up the gravy in their gourd bowls and gave it to the men. Strong Arm dipped some up with a bone dipper that had been made from the skull of a cave bear. Then he pulled out a rib from the carcass and gnawed the meat from the bone. They all held what they ate in their hands. They all ate very fast, and they ate a long time. At last their hunger was satisfied, and they began to crack the marrow bones and scrape the marrow out with sharp sticks and bones. When the men became tired of sucking the bones, they tossed them to the women and children. Then the men joined in a hunting dance while the women beat time with the bones. The women chanted, too, as they beat time. They danced until all became tired and the visitors were ready to go. Then Fire Keeper loaded pieces of meat upon the backs of the women, and all gathered around to see the neighbors start home. As soon as they were gone the Cavemen prepared to rest for the night.

Things to do

Take turns in doing something that the Cavemen did at the feast, and let the children guess what it is. Find some good marrow bones and crack them. Find out whether we use marrow bones for anything to-day. If you think that you can, make something of the marrow bones. Can you think why bones are filled with marrow? See if you can beat time with marrow bones so as to help someone do his work. See if you can make dishes of pumpkins, squashes, melons, cucumbers, or anything else that you can find.

The pedagogical work in these lessons is excellent. The children's expectations are awakened, their curiosity is aroused, all the beast in them is appealed to, every low instinct is made to function on its low plane. If our purpose in educating children is to make monsters of them, cruel, flesh-rending gluttons, filthy in their habits, careless of the feelings of others, disrespectful towards women and children, it would be hard to devise a more effective means of accomplishing our desires than the faithful use of these books in the primary classrooms. Further improvement along these lines is scarcely called for and yet it is supplied in the Eskimo Stories, by Mary E. Smith.

The books we are here discussing, however, not only brutalize the children, but they destroy the foundations for reverence and faith in them by indoctrinating them with false and vicious statements concerning the origin and meaning of society and of religion. We quoted from these books extensively on a former occasion and repeat the quotation here because we want them to be examined side by side with the other typical primary books which are in present use in our schools. The insistence with which false doctrines on fundamental questions make their appearance in these books deserves special attention. The children are taught that society arose from the protection which fire offered against the wild beasts. The tree dwellers lived apart, each one for himself, like the non-gregarious animals. When fire was discovered they collected around it because it kept the wild beasts at bay. In this way they were able to take possession of the caves and find safety in the fire that was kept constantly burning at its mouth. The river rose one night and quenched the fire. As a consequence of this calamity the cave men were fast reverting toward their isolated tree-dwelling habits. It was fire that created society and hence when the fire disappeared society disappeared also. The origin of religion is naïvely told in lessons twenty-four and five, from which we quote the following: "Some of the men had already left the cave and gone to live as tree dwellers live. Strong Arm was trying to keep the rest of them together. He feared that he would not be able to do it unless he could get fire.

For several days after that, the cavemen thought that Strong Arm seemed queer. Wherever he went he carried the drills he used in boring holes. Sometimes he carried bundles of sticks under his arm. Sometimes he worked with all these things in a corner of the cave. None of the cavemen knew what he was doing, but they heard him mumbling to himself. Once they saw him start quickly and go away from the cave. Nobody knew where he went, and nobody knew what he did. Strong Arm was very sad. His heart was sore for his people, for they were in great distress. He believed that the fire god dwelt in the wood, and he was trying to persuade him to come out. He had noticed that the drill became warm by twirling, when he used it for boring holes. So now he made a drill of hard wood and twirled it on a piece of softer wood. As he twirled the stick he prayed to the fire god. He asked him to come and help the cavemen. When he went away from the cave that day he went to find tinder. When he came back that night, he was very happy; for he had a burning torch in his hand. How glad all the cavemen were when they saw Strong Arm coming with fire! They ran out to meet him and shouted for joy. Fire-keeper lighted a fire and the women brought branches to make it blaze. The wild animals sniffed it and ran away. The cavemen joined hands and danced round the fire. They danced until they could dance no more and then sat down on the ground to rest. They asked where Strong Arm found the fire, but he did not tell them then. Some of the cavemen were very selfish. They cared more for themselves than they did for the clan. Some of the men had already left. Others were thinking of going away. Strong Arm wanted to teach them to help one another. So he told them only part of the truth. He said nothing about the fire drill, but told them about his prayer. He said that the fire god came when he called him. At this the cavemen were filled with fear. They looked upon Strong Arm and wondered. After that they treated him with great respect. When they needed a chief, he led them. He was the greatest man of his time." The diabolical ingenuity of this lesson scarcely needs comment. The goodness attributed to Strong

Arm's motives only intensifies the evil and tends to make the story of the origin of religion more plausible to the child than it would otherwise be.

In the literature of evolution comparative anatomy furnishes one of the earliest and strongest arguments for the theory of descent. By arranging the forms of life in an ascending scale from the lowest to the highest the series will be seen to run parallel to the series of developmental phases in embryonic life. To bring the force of this argument down to the child's level, a book is needed for supplementary reading that will deal with this phase of the subject so effectively as to remove from the child's mind all doubt as to the truth of the statement that man has descended from the brute and is still a brute in a high stage of development. Such a book is provided as supplementary reading for the second grade in The Eskimo Stories, by Mary E. Smith of the Lewis-Champlin School, Chicago. What the tree dwellers and the cave dwellers reveal to the child as having taken place in the pleistocene age, this book parallels in the Eskimo life of to-day, nor does it neglect any opportunity to strengthen the conviction of the brute origin of man. Miss Krarer, an Eskimo girl whose picture is given, tells the story of her life, which is calculated to increase the verisimilitude of the other stories in the book. We cannot pause here to go into the gruesome details of the story; we must content ourselves with a single excerpt from Miss Krarer's story. "When a child was naughty, mother would place a bone on the fire, leaving it there until it was hot enough for the grease to boil out. Then she would slap it on the child. She was not particular where she burned her child, except that she was careful not to touch the face. I well remember what my last punishment was for. I had been playing with my little brother inside the snowhouse, and getting very angry with him, threw him down and bit him on the back of the neck. Then my mother burned me on the same spot where I bit him." Here is an excerpt from one of the stories in the book. "Do you think that Nipsu or Agoonack, or their mother, or any one would use this water to wash in when it costs so much time and

labor? No! no! that would seem a sin to them. They do not know how good it is to be clean, but they know how hard it is to get water. Once Agoonack and Nipsu saw their mamma wash baby's face. She washed it with her tongue just as the mamma cats wash the kittens' faces. The baby's face grew almost white. It was a strange sight, and the children asked their mamma many questions. She told them that each of them had been washed in the same way. But this was long ago. The children's faces are now quite brown with grease and dirt, their mother's face is still darker."

It is hard to conceive how children trained along the lines indicated by these books could ever rise above bestial conceptions of life. On such a soil, how could religion or morality flourish? How could the aesthetic faculty unfold, or social law mould the children into worthy citizens? The theoretical considerations put forth in defense of these books exhibit a strange lack of knowledge of the elements of psychology. We are gravely told that this is the only way in which a secure foundation can be laid for morality. The children must be allowed to try each crude, bestial or barbarous device and then learn from experience to supplant these crude standards with others a little more advanced, and gradually the child will arrive at a civilized standard in time to take his place as an adult in the affairs of civilized society. It is alleged that the only other way to teach morality is through the channels of authority, which is wholly inadmissable at the bar of reason. We are told that if the child bases his conduct on the statement of authority and not on the result of his own experience, that in time his awakening intelligence will destroy the foundation on which his authority rested and on which he had built up his moral code, and the consequence will be a collapse of the man's morality and the production of a criminal. We are told that any one may discover in the child of from six to ten years of age the instincts that lead towards conduct such as that described in these books and that hence no obstacle should be put in the way of the natural fulfillment of these instincts.

It is difficult to treat these crude conceptions of biology and

psychology seriously. The veriest tyro in genetic psychology knows that the child's natural tendency is to accept everything on authority, aye, on mere statement, and by testing it and living it out to grasp something of its inner meaning. For the very young child, " it it so, whether so or not," because mamma says so. With him, as with his elders, the only road to knowledge is *credo ut intelligam* (I believe in order that I may understand). What else are the hypotheses and theories of science? and yet all progress is conditioned upon the provisional acceptance of the hypothesis. Again, childhood is the plastic period of life wherein instincts are overlaid with habits that are scarcely less rigid than the inherited adjustments of the organism to its environment. The boy is father to the man. What success would anyone expect to find in the endeavor to teach a man to play the piano who had never touched a musical instrument until he had reached his twentieth year? Linguists tells us that an individual seldom acquires a new phonetic element after the fourteenth year. These early years are, in the admission of all who have studied the matter, the time wherein the great fundamental habits of mind and body are formed. And what is to guide the child in the formation of these habits? The penny dip of his own childish intelligence, or the light and wisdom of the wisest and best of all the ages? Apart altogether from revealed religion, it is sheer insanity to deny the child the benefit of race experience during the critical time in which, his own intelligence being still undeveloped, he is obliged to determine his own character and lay the foundations of his own future. As well turn an infant loose in a wilderness of plenty and bid him find his own food and shelter as to cut off his growing mental life from the wisdom of the ages. In the one case as in the other he is dependent on his elders during the period of development.

Again, granted that those instincts to which appeal is made by these books are present in our children during those tender years, is it not our duty to block the old and undesirable channels of their expression and open to them modes of expression that are consonant with the demands of civilized society? The

article on The Boy Who Goes to Work, by Mr. Lee, to which we have referred above, offers a very thoughtful answer to this question. He points out that these instincts were at one time in race history the correct adjustments to environment. "In the matter of self-support, also, nature's original provision was equally germane. Hunting, fishing, fighting; striking and throwing; running, dodging, lying in wait—the forms of activity which her industrial system required were exactly those prophesied, clearly enough, in our instinctive impulses. The adjustment, here as elsewhere, was once sufficiently exact. But it is not so now. We cannot any longer live by hunting and war and foray, but must, in order to be self-supporting, content ourselves with tying threads, selling ribbons, digging holes, or other even less apposite pursuits. Civilization has stepped in and so altered the rules of the game that it is no longer our game as whispered to us in our inner consciousness. Nature is still aiming us as she did before, but life has side-stepped. Some of our deepest instincts are thus left hanging in the air, calling for a fulfillment that does not exist, reaching to doing things that cannot be done and will get us into trouble if we attempt to do them. . . . We have here, in this maladjustment between the native tendencies and ideals of the boy who goes to work, and the industrial situation as he finds it, the elements of a tragedy of that classic and inevitable kind which consists not in the defeat of a particular scheme of life, but in a conflict of ideals which renders all schemes of life alike impossible. And often under our social arrangements as they now exist this potential tragedy is realized. What then can we do to mend a dislocation which causes such wreckage and waste of spiritual force among our boys and young men, or to mitigate its consequences?" Surely the way to remedy this situation is not to strengthen and develop in the children the original savage tendencies which in their fulfillment are in direct contravention of the conditions of civilized life. And yet this is the program set forth in the text-books we are discussing and lauded by many influential educators in our public school system.

The remedy proposed by Mr. Lee seems altogether more

rational. He says, "there are, in general, three ways of lessening this dislocation: by fitting the boy to the industrial world, by fitting the industrial world to the boy, and by providing an overflow. By the first I do not mean lopping human nature down to fit the bed we have made for it, but bending it so that it will grow and express itself under the unavoidable conditions. The aim of all is not efficiency, but integrity, not increasing industrial output, but promoting life." This is it exactly. Our duty in the presence of the child's instincts is to prevent their developing along lines of an adjustment that is no longer serviceable, and to bend them so as to meet the requirements of civilized Christian life. "Man as nature made him is a great deal more of an industrial being than our modern education has permitted him to be. There are other instincts besides those of hunting and fighting,—instincts especially aimed towards useful labor—which are under our present school system systematically starved. There is the creative instinct, which impels little children to make houses and mud pies, small girls to sew, and small boys to handle tools. This instinct, if we gave it free play—if we did not lock up the materials from the child, or the child, in school, away from the materials—would drill the maker in him. Man is an artificer by nature. It is by shutting the door on nature that we make a barbarian out of him in this respect." The force that expresses itself in the child's instincts may by wise direction be turned into other channels even though these channels are far less developed in the child's physical inheritance and it is precisely the duty of education to direct the vital currents of the child's life so as to form serviceable adjustments to present environmental conditions. To quote once more from Mr. Lee: "What I desire to point out is that when we do provide an all-round education we shall release in our children industrial powers which we now deliberately starve. We shall cease to train away from the serviceable life that nature intended them to lead. I agree absolutely with those who uphold culture rather than direct preparation for practical life as the true aim of primary education. I disagree only with the belief held by some of them

that culture of the human being consists in developing only one corner of his nature, and that in a peculiarly passive and ineffective way, and in thus incidentally unfitting him for useful life. When by truly all-round education we shall have restored to our children those main strands of their being that are now starved out of them, we shall find them possessed of a nature that it is not so easy to defeat. The first choice or preferred expression of the boy's life will still be towards war and foray, and there will still be real spiritual loss from insufficient opportunity of expression in these directions. But he will then have a strong second choice to fall back upon. And a second choice is with Dame Nature a vitally important thing. It is true that the old theory of the general applicability of human force is untenable. Man power is not steam power, to be applied to a guillotine or a church organ impartially. It must act towards its prescribed end or not at all. But it is also true that human nature has more than one end towards which it moves and (a crucial point in this matter) there is in living things a wonderful power of substitution; life that cannot find its way by one channel will often make out marvelously well by another."

The presence, therefore, in our children of instincts that found expression in ancestral savage days is not an argument for the development of these instincts. The force that in former days flowed through these channels of expression must be wisely directed during the early school days into channels that will lead to fruitful, happy expression under the forms of civilized life. We need for our children text-books that will recognize these truths and these text-books will not be play readers, or nature study readers, or culture epoch readers, but readers that will prove serviceable in transforming the children of men into the children of the kingdom.

THOMAS EDWARD SHIELDS.

BOOK REVIEWS.

The Problem of Evolution, by Erich Wasmann, S. J. Authorized Translation. (Herder, St. Louis, 1909.) Pp. xv + 266. Price, $1.60.

This volume is an authorized English translation of the celebrated discussion concerning the problem of Evolution which took place in Berlin in February, 1907. The Preface contains an interesting narrative of the events which led up to the discussion, and tells the story of the treatment which the distinguished Jesuit naturalist received at the hands of the Haeckel enthusiasts—the advocates of *free* thought. The first part of the work contains Father Wasmann's three lectures, entitled The Hypothesis and Theory of Evolution in Natural Science, Theistic and Atheistic Evolution, and The Descent of Man. The second part consists of the different speeches made at the discussion by Father Wasmann's opponents, and his concluding remarks.

The attitude of the author towards the problem of Evolution is one of unhesitating acceptance, within certain limits. He does not consider that monophyletic evolution, that is, the descent of all present organic forms from one primitive form, is scientifically established. But he sees no difficulty in accepting the theory or hypothesis that contemporary flora and fauna are descended from a few primitive types. "Personally," he writes, "I am firmly convinced that the doctrine of evolution, considered as a scientific hypothesis and theory, is not at variance with the Christian theory of life" (p. 18). On the contrary, the evolutionistic theory enhances the Christian idea of God: "If we assume that God is the Creator of all things, and that the world created by Him has evolved independently and automatically, we have actually a greater idea of God than if we regard Him as constantly interfering with the working of the laws of nature." Of course, the words "independently and automatically" are to be taken in the scientific, not in the philosophical, sense. For, as Father Wasmann, undoubtedly, would be the first to acknowledge, every step in the process of evolution is as dependent on the power of God as was the first product of His creative action. In this sense, nothing can be independent or act automatically.

Notwithstanding this admission of the principle of evolution as a theory and hypothesis, Father Wasmann is not prepared to accept all

the conclusions of the evolutionists. He rejects Darwinianism, or the theory that Natural Selection is the sole factor in the evolutionary process. He rejects the doctrine of the evolution of man : "The soul of man cannot owe its origin to evolution" (p. 53).

Not the least of Father Wasmann's services to the cause of Christian Apologetics is the clear and authoritative distinction which he draws between *Darwinism* and *Evolutionism* (p. 40). It is the rarest of experiences to find even among intelligent people a realization of the vast difference that exists between the general theory or hypothesis of evolution on the one hand and the particular Darwinian hypothesis of natural selection on the other. There are many other misunderstandings and hesitancies with regard to evolution, which Father Wasmann's book will do much towards dispelling.

WILLIAM TURNER.

Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode. Von Dr. Martin Grabmann. Erster Band : Die scholastische Methode von ihren ersten Anfängen in der Väterliteratur bis zum Beginn des 12. Jahrhunderts. (Herder, Freiburg und St. Louis, 1909.) Pp. xiii + 354. Price, $1.95.

We have no hesitation in pronouncing this to be the most important contribution to the history of Scholasticism that has appeared in the last fifty years. Since the publication, almost half a century ago, of Stöckl's *Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, an abundance of new manuscript material has been made accessible to the historian, and the services of the men who, like Dr. Baeumker continue to add to that material by the publication of texts must not be overlooked. It is true that Hauréau and De Wulf have made use of the newly published material ; but the former was never a sympathetic student of the scholastics, and the latter, while he has undoubtedly won a high place among the historians of Scholasticism would have stood still higher had he not allowed his peculiar and, some think, arbitrary, classification of the medieval philosophers as "scholastics" and "anti-scholastics," to interfere with his historical exposition of the advance of medieval thought. Dr. Grabmann, indeed, does not aim at giving a complete account of the doctrines of the schoolmen. He confines his researches to the history of the scholastic method. Yet, so complete is his investigation and so thoroughly scholarly is his examination of all the sources, that his book takes rank at once

among the authoritative works of reference on the general history of Scholasticism. Very emphatically, and very wisely, it seems to us, he insists on the continuity between patristic and scholastic philosophy. It was only our ignorance of the literary, philosophical and theological activity of the intervening centuries that led us to imagine a sudden *saltus* between the end of the patristic period and the beginning of the scholastic era. Now that we know more about those centuries, we can reach a verdict more in accordance with the general principle of historical continuity. Of course, we are ready to confess that the products of ninth and tenth century Scholasticism are not entitled to high praise for intrinsic merit or even for originality. Yet, such as they are, the commentaries, glosses and even the excerpts dating from that epoch of transition demonstrate the essential dependence of the scholastics on their predecessors of the patristic era. In point of fact, it could, we think, be shown that the collections of "Excerpta" so common in the Mss. of the ninth and tenth centuries had a direct and a deciding influence on the scholastic method. The grouping of the excerpts in such a way as to suggest contradiction, real or apparent, led to the *Yea and Nay* of Abelard, and thus to the *Videtur quod non* and the *sed contra* of St. Thomas.

It is pleasant to note that although Dr. Grabmann is not prepared to pronounce Eriugena to be the "Father of Scholasticism," he takes M. deWulf severely to task for setting down the great Irishman as the "Father of anti-Scholasticism." He is entirely justified in this, as was pointed out in these pages in a review of Dr. Rand's *Johannes Scottus*, on which, by the way, Dr. Grabmann bases his estimate of Eriugena's influence on Scholasticism.

WILLIAM TURNER.

Report of the Proceedings and Addresses of the Catholic Educational Association at the Sixth Annual Meeting. Boston, Mass., July 12–15, 1909. The Catholic Educational Association, Columbus, Ohio. Pp. vii + 477.

This volume is full of information and counsel for all educators but particularly for those who are responsible for the work of the Catholic schools in the United States. It should find its place in the library of every Catholic school in the land. Membership in the Association at a cost of $2 per annum brings with it a copy of the Proceedings. The present volume opens with the masterly address of the Most Rev. Archbishop of Boston. After welcoming the Association, he adds:

"But I have for you even nobler greeting—the Holy Father bade me to say to you that he watches with the keenest interest the outcome of your present meeting. Well informed as he is of all that you are laboring to accomplish, he sends you, through me, his paternal benediction. Beholding the wreck and ruin which the false ideals of education are bringing upon those nations who have debased and disfigured their once glorious ideals, and realizing as he does that the root of the whole malady is in the pagan ideal animating society, he calls out to the whole world a warning—the warning of a Father solicitous for the welfare of his children. If the holy years of childhood are to be left without moral restraint or guidance, if youth and young manhood are to be cast out upon life without rule or compass, what inevitably must be the end of civilization and society?" The need of Catholic education is set forth in the Archbishop's address in the clearest and strongest light. He goes to the very root of the whole question and his eloquent words should both enlighten and encourage Catholic educators everywhere. We cannot forbear quoting a few more words: "Where the light of faith has gone out there is naught but gloom and confusion. The very simplest and most fundamental truths are being questioned. The whole aspect of life is changing. Out of the darkness millions of hands are reaching out for something that is secure. Out of the babel of myriad voices, each crying its own panacea, arises only the dismal discord of a vain and purposeless philosophy. Amid all the splendor which prosperity and wealth show forth, there is a pathetic hollowness and shallowness which foretell great moral danger. The children are stretching forth their hands for bread and many a heartless scheme called education is offering them only a stone. A generation has arisen which is famishing for the food which nourishes the whole man. It is cruel beyond words to behold the methods by which their tired-out brains are crammed fuller still with the dry and fruitless morsels which have not a drop of moisture, not an atom of nourishment for that in man which is his best and inmost self. . . . If the conception of life be utilitarian, the schools will turn out money machines. If the scope of life be considered merely intellectual acumen, the schools will develop clever criminals. All these views of life are radically or essentially false and, therefore, every system of education built upon them as a foundation is radically and essentially false. The truest philosophy the world has ever known, after all its investigations, its experiments, its reasonings and deductions, has always finally knelt at the feet of religion for its final answer to the all-absorbing question what is life.

And religion the world over, under whatever name, in whatever guise, has ever been the only exponent of a sufficient answer to this question."

The address of the Rt. Rev. Bishop O'Connell, President of the Association, summed up the history of the Association and stated the problems which are not only the chief problems before the Association but also the central problems of Catholic education throughout this country. "The great problem of secondary education is before us, and we must bring into harmonious relations and into systematic adjustment the various departments of our educational activity. Each department lives not to itself alone, but must consider its relations to the other parts of our system; and if we are to maintain our position of influence in American life and if we are to be faithful to the mission given to us we must give special attention to the needs of Catholic higher education."

The papers and discussions of the volume touch a great many subjects of vital interest and the directness and cogency of the reasoning is sufficient indication of the splendid work that is being accomplished by the Catholic Educational Association. It is the record of a year's progress towards unification and system in our heretofore scattered educational endeavor.

THOMAS EDWARD SHIELDS.

Laggards in Our Schools, a Study of Retardation and Elimination in City School Systems, by Leonard P. Ayers, A. M. Charities Publication Committee, New York, 1909. Pp. xv + 236.

American educators owe a deep debt of gratitude to the Russell Sage Foundation for the research work that it is conducting on the conditions of public education in this country. The present volume deals with two problems of surpassing interest to all educators: the retardation of pupils in our schools and the elimination of pupils from our schools before they complete the course in the elementary school. In the last few years attention has been focused on these problems. Their magnitude and importance are seen at once when we glance at the fact that in some cities, such as Camden, N. J., thirty per cent. of the children are repeating their grade and that the average percentage of repeaters throughout the cities of the country is more than sixteen per cent. There are more than six million children in this class in the United States and the cost of this wasteful process of repetition in our cities alone is about $27,000,000 per annum. We get a still better appreciation of the meaning of these figures when we learn that

very few of the retarded pupils remain in school to finish the eighth grade. Their lives are thus ruined by the maladjustment of the schools to the pupils for whose benefit they are supposed to exist. That the evil is in large measure curable is proved by the fact that in many cities it has been reduced to a minimum. In our city schools eight children on an average are retarded for every one that is progressing faster than the grade. "Our courses of study, therefore, as at present constituted, are fitted not to the slow child or the average child, but to the unusually bright one." The school is thus turned into an engine for the crushing and discouraging of multitudes of our children.

The problem of elimination is not less interesting than that of retardation. The general tendency in our city schools is to carry all the children through the fifth grade, to take one-half of them to the eighth grade, and one-tenth through the high school. This process of elimination varies greatly in different parts of the country. The question of coeducation receives a bright ray of illumination from the facts presented in the volume before us. There is thirteen per cent. more retardation among boys than among girls; there is thirteen per cent. more repeaters among the boys. The number of girls who complete the course in the elementary school is seventeen per cent. higher than the number of boys. "Those facts mean that our schools as at present constituted are far better fitted to the needs of the girls than they are to those of the boys." The study of retardation and elimination according to nationality gives some very surprising figures. It has been generally assumed that the foreign children, owing to difficulties with the language, made up the bulk of the retarded children in cities which have a large emigrant population, such as New York. Investigation of the question was made in fifteen public schools in New York City with the following results. The percentage of retardation among the children of the different nationalities was as follows: German, 16%, American, 19%, Mixed, 19%, Russian, 23%, English, 24%, Irish, 29%, Italians, 36%. Evidently our schools are not fitted to the needs of the children of these various nationalities. Nor is it a question of language, for there is a much larger percentage of retardation among the English and Irish than among the Russians and Germans, nor will it be conceded readily that the difference in these percentages represents a difference of native ability.

The problems which this book sets out to solve are stated in the opening chapter as follows: "The object of the investigation was to study the problem of the progress of school children through the

grades. Its interest was not in the individual, sub-normal, or atypical child but rather in that large class, varying with local conditions from 5 to 75 per cent. of all the children in our schools, who are older than they should be for the grades they are in. The questions the investigation set itself to answer were these: How many of the children in our schools fail to make normal progress from grade to grade and why do they fail? How many of the children drop out of school before finishing the elementary course and why do they drop out? What are the facts and what are the remedies?'' Probably the best praise that could be given this work is that it has more than satisfied the expectations aroused by this splendid program.

THOMAS EDWARD SHIELDS.

Cartells et Trusts, par Et. Martin Saint-Leon. Paris: Librairie Victor Le Coffre, 1909.

This work which upon its first appearance received a gold medal at the St. Louis Expedition in 1903 is now in its third edition and has been brought down to date. It undertakes to explain the meaning of the amalgamation in industry which has received so much attention in the last two or three decades, to estimate its usefulness, and to suggest the ultimate outcome of the movement. Particular attention is given to Germany and to the United States, as being the countries in which combinations among producers have proceeded furthest. But considerable space is devoted also to Austria, France, England and other countries.

M. Martin Saint-Leon sees in economic history a long series of conflicts between the principles of freedom and restriction. Authority and liberty are the poles between which oscillate perpetually the economic as well as the political life of the nation. In ancient Greece and early Rome was found perfect freedom of production, whereas under the later Roman Empire there existed the most minute regulation of the corporations of artisans and subjection of entire families to particular trades. The principle of freedom appeared again in the Middle Ages in the guilds, where one became a master simply by serving one's time and paying certain dues. In the centuries following, however, these guilds become 'close corporations jealous of outsiders and instruments of a merchant oligarchy which considers that it has a monopoly of industry. Later, with the Revolution in France, comes the declaration of industrial liberty and the overthrow of the old

monopolies. In the following century this freedom together with the introduction of machinery on a large scale results in a division of labor to a degree hitherto unknown. In contrast with the conditions when goods were produced by hand, each manufacturer now finds that the larger his total output becomes, the smaller will be its cost per unit. The result is over-production and a life and death struggle for the market. Those who survive the slaughter are compelled to organize among themselves for mutual safety. Thus again is ushered in monopoly under the forms of the cartell and the trust.

The cartell is the European form of industrial organization which corresponds in a general way with the American trust. It is an agreement among independent producers for the purpose of restraining competition and securing stability and profits by lowering the cost of raw material or by a limitation of production or by a fixing of a minimum price. One notable point of distinction between it and the trust lies in the fact that the members composing the cartell continue to operate their plants individually. The strictest of the cartells confine themselves to limiting the output and undertaking the sale of the product. In a word, the cartell is merely an agreement (*entente*) among producers, whereas the trust is an amalgamation (*fusion*). The conspicuous advantage of the cartell is its power to economize in buying the raw material and selling the finished product; the trust not only enjoys this advantage but adds to it economy in the processes of production.

The author is neither willing to look upon the trusts as the product of an inevitable evolution and necessarily beneficent, nor to denounce them without distinction. As an industrial factor the trusts have great capacity for good, but socially he believes their potentialities for evil must be reckoned with. Where monopoly has resulted from over-production he believes that the tariff ought to be reduced, but he discounts somewhat the time-honored saying that the tariff is the mother of the trusts by calling attention to the fact that trusts are being formed in free-trade England. Over-capitalization, which is one of the chief sources of evil in the trusts, he would remedy by publicity. He commends the cartell as being superior to the trust in that it is a pool without water. The solution of the trust problem in general, will, he thinks, consist in finding the middle ground of regulation where the interests of producers will be reconciled with those of society at large.

The book is an exceptionally lucid presentation of the subject and shows a wide acquaintance with its literature. One is especially im-

pressed with the author's grasp of political and economic conditions in the United States. It is to be hoped, however, that he is mistaken when he speaks of the "final failure of President Roosevelt's courageous but unfortunate campaign against the trusts." To one who has access to the standard American works the volume will not contribute much that is new on the American situation, but it is valuable as giving a convenient statement of combinations of capital in Europe and in giving an estimate of the comparative development of these combinations in the new and old worlds.

FRANK O'HARA.

The Decree on Holy Communion. A Historical Sketch and Commentary. By Father Juan B. Ferreres, S. J. Translated by H. Jiminez. London, Sands & Co. St. Louis, Herder, 1909. Pp. 168.

The Decree "Sancta Tridentina Synodus," marks a new phase in church discipline on a matter of grave importance. It settles practically a controversy which, in the past, has ranged the most illustrious theologians in opposing ranks. As a consequence, therefore, of the Decree, our approved text-books of moral theology stand in need of revision on the subject of daily or frequent communion. Priests and ecclesiastical students will find in this concise and clear commentary everything that they require to know regarding the import of the Decree. It is brief, but the writer's orderly treatment of the subject has enabled him to compress much information within narrow bounds.

The text of the document is given; and analyzed into its dogmatic, historical and disciplinary elements. Then the author reviews the history of the two conflicting opinions, first, previous to the Council of Trent; secondly, from that time down to the present day. He recites the names of the great theologians who are found, respectively, on each side. Finally, he points out the obligations and privileges to which the new legislation gives rise; and lucidly resolves all the difficulties that occur in the interpretation of the texts.

Some Roads to Rome in America. Being Personal Records of Conversions to the Catholic Church. Edited by Georgina Pell Curtis. St. Louis : Herder, 1909. Pp. 532. Price, $1.75.

In this volume we have the personally written accounts of the influences which led about fifty Americans from various forms of unbelief or heresy to the bosom of the Catholic Church. The papers have a human interest along with their controversial value. Some are pleasantly diffuse and confidential ; while others confine themselves to the bold indication of some theological argument which proved to be the ground of intellectual conviction. The general lesson of the collection is that grace may come through countless channels and that while Catholic truth and worship appeal to the whole man, personal character and antecedents largely determine which form of that appeal will efficaciously reach the soul. With one, the beginning of conversion is an incident of childhood; with another, some chance acquaintance made with a Catholic. Some are attracted by the splendor of the church's worship which leaves others cold or unfriendly. The greater number, however, testify that the most powerful influences are the doctrine of the Real Presence and the principle of authority ; while, here and there, one is reminded that *le cœur a ses raisons que la raison ne connait pas.* The book cannot but prove a source of future conversions similar to those of which it is the record. In it the non-Catholic will, in many cases, recognize his own difficulties, aversions, prejudices, sympathetically expressed by some one who has felt their strength no less than he himself, and yet found them dissolve when the light of Catholic truth was permitted to fall upon them.

Meditations on the Gospels for Every Day in the Year. Translated from the French of Pére Médaille, S. J. Edited by William Henry Eyre, S. J. St. Louis, Herder, 1909. Pp. 542. Price $1.50.

When a book has lived for two hundred years, in various European tongues, and can, in successive editions, still command a market, we may be sure that it is a strong book of its kind. Father Médaille, the author of these meditations died in 1709. His work has lived and spread in five languages, and appeared for the first time in English in 1896. A new edition which has just appeared is proof that, in passing into our tongue, the salt has not lost its savor.

The Meditations are of a quality to recommend themselves to minds impatient of the overwrought sentimentality, or excessive flights of imagination, with which many such writings abound. They are sober, terse, and rich in suggestion that flows naturally from the thoughts furnished for reflection. The editor has wisely modified here and there, some of the expressions of the original—notably, for example, on the meditation on the number of the elect—which, as he observes, would possibly, be more susceptible of misinterpretation to-day than they would have been a hundred years ago. The meditations are short ; each one embraces two points, and the average length of each point is about ten lines. The author never departs from his plan of basing his reflections on the Holy Scripture ; and, generally speaking, he selects some of the words of our Lord himself, to which method the meditations owe their solid worth.

Report of the Nineteenth Eucharistic Congress, held at Westminster from 9th to 13th September, 1908. London and Edinburgh, Sands & Co. St. Louis, Herder, 1909. Pp. 684. Price $1.75.

The Eucharistic Congress of 1908, which was held in London, was not a mere national event. Rather it was, as Cardinal Vanutelli termed it, a Congress of Nations. At the same time it was also a national affair, the most significant event in English Catholicism since the meeting of the first Provincial Synod after the restoration of the hierarchy. To the earlier occurrence the genius of Newman consecrated a monument of beauty that shall last as long as the English language. If the glories of the recent celebration have not enjoyed the service of immortal eloquence to perpetuate the memory of them they are, nevertheless, not unworthily enshrined in the opulent volume which relates the doings of the Congress.

It records the splendor of that great gathering and faithfully reproduces the atmosphere of loyalty and piety which pervaded those eventful days. Its historical value is but one part of its worth ; for, we have in it all the papers which were read at the Congress. They all bear upon the Holy Eucharist. Many deal with historical subjects ; but these, though marked with scholarly merit, discuss their topics rather for the purpose of edification than for the mere interests of scholarship. Others discuss the various ways and means whereby, in the life around us, devotion to the Holy Eucharist may be extended

and rendered more efficacious against the evils of to-day. They are full of practical counsels that deserve the attention of all charged with the pastoral office. Taken as a whole the volume is a splendid witness to the continuity and universality of the church, and to the fact that the centre of her worship and the source of her strength is the Holy Eucharist.

Christ, the Church and Man. By His Eminence, Cardinal Capecelatro, Archbishop of Capua. London, Burns and Oates. St. Louis, Herder, 1909. Pp. 70.

The purport of this little book of seventy pages is to inculcate upon the clergy that the struggle between religion and unbelief has assumed a new aspect in the present day, and that to meet it victoriously the clergy must first thoroughly study contemporary conditions, and then introduce such changes into their course of studies and methods of apologetics as are needed in order successfully to carry on their mission. Though addressed directly to Italians the exhortations and suggestions of the learned Cardinal, who looks clearly and steadily at the passing scene, have a world-wide application. Though he does not underrate the difficulties under which the church struggles to-day, his note is one of hope and encouragement. We are, he says, at the dawn of a new and more favorable era, provided the clergy realize their opportunities and adjust their forces properly to the demands of the warfare. He insists chiefly on a wide study of literature, and a hearty courageous movement to grapple with the great social problem in order to cut the ground from the feet of the Socialists by demonstrating that the iniquitous features of the prevailing social and economic conditions may be abolished by the application of the Gospel's teaching. A small book, but a weighty one, well worth study by every priest.

INVESTITURE OF MONSIGNOR SHAHAN.

On Thursday, December 16th, the Right Reverend Rector was invested with the dignity of Domestic Prelate in Divinity Chapel. The services began at eleven o'clock with the celebration of Mass. Reverend Doctor Dumont, President of Caldwell Hall, was celebrant. After the mass the Reverend Doctor Hyvernat made a brief address in which, after outlining the history of the office of Domestic Prelate, he pointed out the significance of Monsignor Shahan's elevation to that dignity. Reverend Doctor Turner then read the papal brief, after which His Eminence, Cardinal Gibbons, Chancellor of the University, invested Monsignor Shahan with the robes of his new rank.

Dr. Hyvernat's discourse was, in part, as follows :

Your Eminence, Right Reverend Monsignori, Very Reverend Rector, Fellow Professors, Students and Friends of the University.

In accepting the task of addressing you to-day on the occasion of the investiture of our beloved Rector, the Very Rev. Dr. Thomas J. Shahan, with the insignia of a domestic prelate, my intention was not to pronounce a eulogy which, I know, would be just as distasteful to the well known modesty of the recipient, as unbecoming to the place in which we are assembled. The house of God should resound with the praises of Him only, not of men.

I chose, therefore, as more appropriate in every way, briefly to remind you of the meaning of the title our Holy Father has conferred on our Rector, and of the significance of that event for this Institution.

The title is that of *Antistes Urbanus* ; the first word *Antistes* indicating one that stands at the head of others in rank of dignity, while the second word *Urbanus* shows that he belongs to Rome, *Urbis*, in contradistinction to the rest of the Christian world, *Orbis*, and consequently that no one can hold such a title except

from the bishop of Rome, the Pope himself. A common substitute for the title of *Antistes Urbanus* is *Domesticus Prælatus.* The grammatical relation of those two words is possibly somewhat obscure, but, at all events, they indicate clearly, first an official belonging to the immediate and personal environment of the Pope, and secondly, the right of precedence in respect of other clerics and laymen.

There is no doubt as to the great antiquity of the domestic prelates, as a Pontifical institution, nor as to their great importance in the management of Church affairs. It is true that in course of time some of the offices they used to hold have passed into the hands of higher officials, not unfrequently of Cardinals. This, for instance, was the case for the Chancery; and we are told that if the Cardinal in charge of it now, is styled Vice-Chancellor, and not simply Chancellor, it is in order not to belittle the dignity of the Sacred College by conferring on one of its members a title once held by an official of a class decidedly inferior in rank. Still the title of Domesticus Prælatus remains one of the highest and most honorable the Holy See can confer on a cleric without conferring on him at the same time actual jurisdiction, as when one is appointed bishop. Like the bishops, Domestic Prelates are addressed in Latin as *Reverendissimi,* or in English as Right Reverend, while the Chamberlains, who also belong to the Pontifical Family are styled simply *Admodum Reverendi,* or Very Reverend. Like bishops also, the Domestic Prelates wear violet robes and the Rochet and Manteletta.

These high dignitaries are of two kinds, residential in Rome, and non-residential. As a rule residential Domestic Prelates are, as I have said, holders of important offices in the various congregations and other administrative organizations, and the title is generally conferred on them with the office. Outside of Rome the title is bestowed in most cases at the request of the ordinaries, on distinguished ecclesiastics as a reward for long and signal services rendered to the Church; and, sometimes, also and principally, in view of some high office to which the recipient has been promoted. In this latter case, the title in the mind of the Pope is not so much a reward as it is an encouragement to the officer who now appears before the public, clothed so to speak in the

authority of the Holy See. The honor is intended for the office itself just as much as, if not more than, for the man.

That it is really so in the present case is clear from the history of the foundation of this institution. As you well know the creation of the Catholic University of America was decided by the hierarchy of this country at the Third Plenary Council of Baltimore. But the plans of the bishops had no sooner matured that they hastened to send them to Rome, begging the Pope, Leo XIII, not only to approve their decision of establishing this great center of learning, but to create it himself, which he did in fact, though not in title. So that this university is not an ordinary Catholic university but really a Pontifical university, just as much as the various Roman institutions, the names of which include the qualification of Pontifical. As a Pontifical university this institution is, as it was from its very beginning, the object of the Holy Father's special care and solicitude. He appointed once for all its Chancellor in the person of the Archbishop of Baltimore, and the same procedure is followed for the election and appointment of its Rector as in the case of the appointment of a bishop. The Very Rev. Dr. Thomas J. Shahan, therefore, like his predecessors in the office of Rector of the Catholic University of America, is really the representative of the Holy See and it is evident that this was principally what our Holy Father wanted to publish to the Christian world in conferring on him the title and dignity of a prelate of his house. This ceremony has a much greater significance than the mere recognition of Dr. Shahan's past services, however great they may be. It reminds the hierarchy of this country that this University, although the fruit of their joint zeal and wisdom, was adopted, so to speak, by the Pope, who appointed them its tutors and protectors, and that consequently they are irrevocably bound to further its growth and increase its efficiency. It reminds the Rector, that he is appointed to act and speak in this institution for the highest authority in the Christian world, that he is expected to work to the best of his energy and intelligence, and with a truly Apostolic zeal for the upbuilding of this great center of learning, that he is to govern it according to the rules and directions of the one whose colors he shall now wear. It reminds us, Professors and instructors of all grades, that

we are not mere salaried officers but, in the truest sense of the word, Apostles. He who merely wishes to make a living or achieve a reputation for science had better not offer his services to this University. And you students, you will be reminded by the ceremony you are going to witness, that you have not come here simply to obtain an education, as you might find it in any other university. You are here to become enlightened Catholics, as well as to fit yourselves for a profession in the world; you are here to become militant Catholics as well as useful and progressive citizens. Nor is the solemn announcement of the dignity conferred on the Very Rev. Dr. Shahan of less significance for the Catholics of this country at large. For it is a token of the interest the Holy Father takes in the great Institution created for their benefit, and a pledge that their children will be taught here not only human wisdom but also what constitutes the surest foundation and the most glorious crowning of a scholarly education, the vivifying principles and rules of our Holy Religion.

Before closing this brief address I wish to state that in representing the title and dignity which the Holy Father has deigned to confer upon our beloved Rector as an indication of what he is expected to do in the future rather than as a reward for his services, I, in no wise, intended to detract from his past merits, of which eighteen years of companionship in academic work has made me keenly conscious, nor did I wish to detract from the honor attached to that same title and dignity. I merely wished to bring out more clearly the true significance of this great occasion and the teaching it contains both for our Rector and for ourselves, so that we may all go on with increased energy in the accomplishment of our respective duties to this University for the greater glory of God.

UNIVERSITY CHRONICLE.

Public Lectures. During the Fall Term, the following Public Lectures were delivered in the Assembly Room of McMahon Hall:

Oct. 13—The Smithsonian Institution.
CHARLES D. WALCOTT, Secretary.

Oct. 20—The Interstate Commerce Commission.
EDWARD A. MOSELEY, Secretary.

Oct. 27—The American Bureau of Ethnology.
JAMES MOONEY, U. S. Ethnologist.

Nov. 3—The Bureau of Engraving and Printing.
JOSEPH E. RALPH, Director.

Nov. 10—The International Bureau of the American Republics.
JOHN J. BARRETT, Director.

Nov. 17—The General Land Office.
FREDERICK DENNETT, Commissioner.

Nov. 24—The Bureau of Education.
ELMER E. BROWN, Commissioner.

Dec. 1—The Department of Agriculture.
WILLET M. HAYS, Ass't Secretary.

Dec. 9—The Weather Bureau.
WILLIS L. MOORE, Chief.

Dec. 15—The Forest Service.
GIFFORD PINCHOT, Chief Forester.

Patronal Feast of the University. On Wednesday, December 8th, the Feast of the Immaculate Conception, the Patronal Feast of the University, was celebrated in Divinity Chapel. At the Solemn High Mass the celebrant was Very Reverend Charles F. Aiken, D. D., Dean of the Faculty of Theology, and the preacher was Reverend D. J. Kennedy, O. P., Professor of Sacramental Theology.